The domestic economic impacts of immigration by Roodman, David
    
The domestic economic impacts of immigration  
 
David Roodman1 
September 2014 
 
Summary: This paper critically reviews the research on the impact of immigration on employment and 
wages of natives in wealthy countries—where “natives” includes previous immigrants and their 
descendants. While written for a non-technical audience, the paper engages with technical issues and 
probes one particularly intense scholarly debate in an appendix. While the available evidence is not 
definitive, it paints a consistent picture. Industrial economies can generally absorb migrants quickly, in part 
because capital is mobile and flexible, in part because immigrants are consumers as well as producers. 
Thus, long-term average impacts are probably zero at worst. And the long-term may come quickly, 
especially if migration inflows are predictable to investors. Possibly, skilled immigration boosts 
productivity and wages for many others. Around the averages, there are distributional effects. Among low-
income “native” workers, the ones who stand to lose the most are those who most closely resemble new 
arrivals, in being immigrants themselves, being low-skill, being less assimilated, and, potentially, 
undocumented. But native workers and earlier immigrants tend to benefit from the arrival of workers 
different from them, who complement more than compete with them in production. Thus skilled 
immigration can offset the effects of low-skill immigration on natives and earlier immigrants. 
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Introduction and summary 
The immigration policies of wealthy nations could be prime leverage points for those seeking to influence 
US government policy for the global public good. “Observably identical” people—ones with the same 
education, age, sex, and so on—earn 2.0–15.5 times more in the United States than in poor countries such 
as Peru, Haiti, Egypt, and Yemen (Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett 2008). Allowing more low-income 
foreigners to work in wealthy nations could therefore raise their incomes more than almost any other step 
that governments or philanthropists can take.1  
But there is a concern: Does allowing more immigration take jobs from people already in the labor force of 
the receiving country? Or does it depress their pay? This document performs due diligence on this 
question, especially as it pertains to low-skill workers in the receiving country, who can least afford to lose 
earnings. The document reviews the relevant economics literature to glean what is known about the 
impacts of immigration on employment and wages, as well as innovation and productivity, which affect 
earnings in the long run. 
The debate over the economic impacts of immigration can be seen as a battle between metaphors. Is an 
economy like a pie, with a set number of jobs, so that one person’s employment gain is another’s loss? Or is 
it like a church congregation, which one person can join to experience communion and fellowship without 
costing anyone else the same? 
To a first approximation the answer is clear: the latter. In wealthy nations at least, jobs and labor earnings 
are not in rigidly fixed supply. Jobs are relationships of exchange, forming and disintegrating every day. 
Like other relationships, their absolute number can expand with population. The arrival of new workers 
creates new possibilities for production even as it increases consumer demand for goods and services. 
Wealthy nations are wealthy precisely because of ability to squeeze value out of available resources, 
including human talent. 
Still, that is only a first approximation. Real economies are not perfectly flexible. Nor are they guaranteed to 
meet the needs of the poor. So it is worth examining the evidence on the impacts of immigration on those 
already arrived, especially the poorest among them. This can have implications for immigration reform, 
perhaps including collateral policies to compensate for side effects. 
As ever, the evidence base is not as sturdy as we would wish. Ironically, immigration policy is often 
arbitrary and even randomized (as in visa lotteries), which has allowed some high-quality measurement of 
impacts on immigrants (McKenzie, Gibson, and Stillman 2010; Clemens 2013b). Unfortunately, this 
randomness has not been as exploitable when assessing impacts on the receiving economy, because 
admissions have not been randomized across occupations, say, or cities.2 Studies in one family attempt the 
next-best thing, exploiting natural experiments, and some are persuasive. The rest of the research is less 
experiment-like, for example, looking at correlations between wages and immigration flows across US 
cities over 20 years, and so must be taken with more grains of salt. Most of non-experimental studies 
reviewed here make a bid in the direction of natural experiments by instrumenting. But even when they 
aggressively check the instrumented results for robustness, it is hard to be sure that the strategy is 
 
1 Certain health interventions might rival the impacts of immigration, depending on the value placed on health and 
life. This is why the text compares immigration to other interventions in terms of income. 
2 Peri, Shih, and Sparber (2014b) ventures in this direction, but I argue below that it falls short. 
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working.3  
Still, the available evidence paints a fairly consistent and plausible picture: 
• There is almost no evidence of anything close to one-to-one crowding out by new immigrant 
arrivals to the job market in industrial countries. Most studies find that 10 percentage point 
increase in the immigrant “stock” as a share of the labor force changes natives’ earnings by between 
–2% and +2% (Longhi, Nijkamp, and Poot 2005, Fig 1; Peri 2014, p. 1). Although serious questions 
can be raised about the reliability of most studies, the scarcity of evidence for great pessimism 
stands as a fact. The economies of destination countries largely appear flexible enough to absorb 
new arrivals, especially given time. 
• The group that appears most vulnerable to competitive pressure from new low-skill migrants is 
recent low-skill migrants. This possibility is easy to miss when talking of the impacts of 
“immigrants” on “natives.” Yet it stands to reason: a newly arrived Mexican with less than a high 
school education competes most directly with an earlier-arrived Mexican with less than a high 
school education. 
• One factor damping the economic side effects of immigration is that immigrants are consumers as 
well as producers. They increase domestic demand for goods and services, perhaps even more 
quickly than they increase domestic production (Hercowitz and Yashiv 2002), since they must 
consume as soon as they arrive. They expand the economic pie even as they compete for a slice. 
This is not to suggest that the market mechanism is perfect—adjustment to new arrivals is not 
instantaneous and may be incomplete—but the mechanism does operate. 
• A second damper is that in industrial economies, the capital supply tends to expand along with the 
workforce. More workers leads to more offices and more factories. Were receiving economies not 
flexible in this way, they would not be rich. This mechanism too may not be complete or immediate, 
but it is substantial in the long run: since the industrial revolution, population has doubled many 
times in the US and other now-wealthy nations, and the capital stock has kept pace, so that today 
there is more capital per worker than 200 years ago. 
• A third damper is that while workers who are similar compete, ones who are different complement. 
An expansion in the diligent manual labor available to the home renovation business can spur that 
industry to grow, which will increase its demand for other kinds of workers, from skilled general 
contractors who can manage complex projects for English-speaking clients to scientists who 
develop new materials for home building. Symmetrically, an influx of high-skill workers can 
increase demand for low-skill ones. More computer programmers means more tech businesses, 
which means more need for janitors and security guards. Again, the effect is certain, though its 
speed and size are not. 
• An important corollary of this last observation is that a migrant inflow that mirrors the receiving 
population in skills mix is likely to have the most benign effects. Especially once capital ramps up to 
match the labor expansion, a balanced inflow probably approximates a dilation of the receiving 
economy, with similar percentage increases in all classes of workers, concomitant growth in 
aggregate demand, and minimal perturbation in prices for goods, services, and labor. In particular, 
one way to cushion the impact of low-skill migration on low-skill workers already present is to 
increase skilled immigration in tandem. 
Figures that capture a lot of these ideas come from Ottaviano and Peri (2012). Between 1990 and 2006 
immigration contributed 13.2 percentage points of growth to the US stock of low-education workers (ones 
 
3 See the section, “On the econometric challenges of studying causality,” in my review of the impacts of life-saving 
interventions on fertility (davidroodman.com/?p=422). 
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with no college) and 10.0 points to high-education workers (Ottaviano and Peri 2012, Table 1). As a result 
of this fairly skill-balanced inflow, they estimate, the average native-born worker’s earnings rose 0.6%. 
However, the impacts of the inflow on earlier immigrants is estimated as much larger because it increased 
the number of immigrant workers in the US not by some 10%, but 125%. The added competitive pressure 
is calculated to have cut earlier immigrants’ pay by 6.7%. For earlier immigrants with less than a high 
school education, the figure is 8.1%; and for those with a high school education but no college, it is 12.6%. 
(Ottaviano and Peri 2012, Table 6, col 7.) 
If taken to approximate the truth, the impact estimates for earlier low-skill migrants pose a moral question 
for those pondering advocacy for more immigration. How should the economic harm to this relatively 
vulnerable group be weighed? That question is beyond the scope of this analysis, so I will touch on it only 
briefly. Some ways to answer it may be obvious: pure utilitarianism; conditioning support for more 
immigration on strengthening the social safety net even for undocumented residents already present. A 
less obvious approach is based on an argument for equal treatment of similarly situated people: that it 
would be unjust to protect recent immigrants, who have recently, say, tripled their incomes by moving 
from Mexico to the US (Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett 2008, Fig 3), by preventing other Mexicans 
from enjoying the same opportunity, especially if it would only cost the recent immigrants 20 points of 
their 200% gain.4 
Before, I distinguished between randomized studies, natural experiments, and non-experimental ones. 
Another way to classify immigration impact studies is by the unit of analysis. Some are spatial: they looks at 
whether cities or states or provinces receiving more migrants over some period (whether or not because of 
a “natural experiment”) experienced different trends in wages or employment for native workers, or 
patenting rates or productivity. Another influential set compares across groups defined by occupation or 
years of work experience and years of education. For example, do the education groups (or “skill cells”) 
gaining more immigrants see wages rise or fall more for natives? Some studies split the data both ways at 
once—by place and by skill or occupation. 
With those distinctions in mind, I have organized this review as follows. I look first at studies of impacts on 
wages and employment, then ones on innovation and productivity, factors that can drive wage growth in 
the long run. Studies in the wages-and-employment category are further organized by whether they make 
(convincing) cases to be exploiting natural experiments. Those not relying on natural experiments come 
first; and among them, the spatial one are reviewed first, then the skill cell–based ones. 
1 Conceptual preliminaries 
Our general question is what happens when new participants of a particular kind enter an industrial 
economy. These new participants will affect the receiving economy in two main ways: as consumers of 
output and providers of input. The symmetry in that simple observation suffices to suggest that the overall 
impact of immigration will be benign. The immigrants will compete with other workers, but they will also 
buy things, supporting increased production. 
But immigrants’ economic impacts as consumers and producers could differ distributionally, with net harm 
for certain vulnerable groups. Immigrants’ economic impact as consumers is probably diffuse and similar 
in many ways to the distributional impact of the average consumer. Their shopping baskets contain high- 
 
4 The 6.7% loss cited in the previous paragraph becomes a 20% loss expressed relative to pre-immigration earnings, 
since those are assumed one-third as large. 
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and low-tech items, some made locally and some imported, some as tangible as bricks, some as intangible 
as credit. As participants in the labor market, however, immigrants’ impacts could be more concentrated, 
hurting some workers and helping others. This is one reason most of the research focuses on labor market 
impacts. 
Accepting that focus, two dynamics seem key to shaping the impacts. The first has to do with how 
immigrant workers, as inputs, could complement or replace other workers in production. If new 
immigrants are interchangeable with most other workers, then the competitive effects of their arrival 
should be diffuse. The second dynamic has to do with how quickly the capital stock adjusts to the expansion 
of labor. The quicker the adjustment, the quicker the economy will achieve the growth made possible by 
additional workers, and the more transient the initial side effects. This section elaborates on both ideas. 
1.1 Elasticity of substitution 
An elasticity of substitution characterizes the relationship between two inputs to production—regular and 
premium gasoline, fuel and engines, natives and immigrants, labor and capital. It is a one-dimensional, 
spectrum concept. Understanding it requires this insight: distinct inputs can interact economically in two 
main ways. To the extent that they play the same role in production, like different grades of gasoline, they 
compete in the same product market, and greater supply of one can reduce demand for the other. But to the 
extent that they play different roles in production, greater supply of one can increase demand for the other, 
just as more engines in operation can raise gasoline demand. 
At one extreme, two inputs can have an infinite elasticity of substitution, making them perfect substitutes. 
This does not quite mean that they are exact replacements for each other, but that they work like scaled 
versions of each other. A gallon of premium gas, for instance, might be equivalent in all ways to 1.1 gallons 
of regular unleaded. A driver could smoothly switch between the two without changing anything else, and 
obtain 10% more output from her engine per gallon of premium. The two types of fuel play the same role in 
the making of motion. Further, if premium cost exactly 10% more—as it will in the standard models of 
microeconomics—then the driver wouldn’t care which she buys: she would get the same value per dollar. 
At the opposite extreme is zero elasticity of substitution, or perfect complementarity. Like an engine and 
fuel, if two inputs are perfect complements, each is useless without the other. Flipping that around, 
expanded availability of each makes the other more valuable. And neither can substitute at all for the other. 
You can’t fill your tank with engine. 
Small-scale examples like these tend to produce extremes on the substitute-complement spectrum. But as 
one considers broader economic aggregates such as natives and immigrants, shades of grey appear. To an 
extent, for example, natives and immigrants compete for the same jobs, so that natives are hurt by 
competition from immigrants. But at the same time, the two groups complement one another: American 
restaurants commonly hire natives for the retail interface (waiting tables) and immigrants with little 
English for the kitchen. To this extent, expanded supply of one is good for the other. The arrival of people 
ready to work in the kitchens lets the restaurant business expand, raising demand for native wait staff. 
Adding to the blurriness, degrees of substitutability vary over time. In the short run, labor and capital are 
mostly complements, as a strike can shut down a factory. In the long run, capital can substitute for labor 
through automation. 
In principle, every input to a process like bicycle manufacture, viewed as a giant production process 
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running from raw ores to finished goods, has an elasticity of substitution with every other input. With 
limited data, economists can only study a few elasticities at a time, so they focus on the ones most relevant 
to their research, estimate them from the data, and use the results to model how changes in the supply of 
economic inputs such as native and immigrant labor affect each other’s prices. 
The worst-case immigration scenario for native low-skill workers involves a certain combination of 
elasticities of substitution. First, native and immigrant low-skill workers would be perfect substitutes. 
Again, this would not mean that an immigrant is precisely as valuable to an employer as a native, but that 
the low-skill immigrants and natives can fill exactly the same roles in production, and so compete for the 
same jobs. Perhaps two immigrants could replace one native in a restaurant, at half the pay rate. Second, 
low-skill workers as a group, native and foreign-born, would in turn be perfect complements to skilled 
workers, such as restaurant managers. Under these circumstances, an influx of purely low-skill immigrants 
would increase competition for precisely the jobs low-skill natives can do. Yet for lack of additional 
managerial cadre—for lack of a parallel influx of high-skill workers—the restaurant industry would not 
expand. The pool of low-skill restaurant jobs would remain fixed, even as competition for them intensified. 
Native low-skill workers would be maximally squeezed. 
The best-case scenario for low-skill natives is opposite: complementary between low-skill natives and low-
skill immigrants (they mostly compete for different jobs) and high substitutability between low-skill 
workers as a group and other workers, so that the expanded pool of low-skill workers could push a bit into 
somewhat more-skilled jobs, diffusing the competitive impacts. 
To investigate which scenario is most realistic, economists link the theoretical concept of elasticity of 
substitution with the concrete process of looking at correlations between wages and labor supply. The link 
is made by assuming that markets work reasonably well, in the following sense. In a perfect market, if a 
gallon of paint is perfect substitute for a quart, then it will always cost exactly four times as much as a quart. 
Increased production of quarts of paint might lower paint prices overall, but it will not break the iron rule 
of four. Thus the ratio in supply of quarts to gallons will have zero correlation with the ratio in price. At the 
opposite extreme, an increase in the supply of car engines in use relative to the supply of fuel could have a 
big, negative impact on the ratio of their prices: more engines per available fuel would mean higher prices 
for fuel relative to engines. 
Perhaps a more intuitive way to think about elasticities of substitution is this: they tell us how integrated or 
segmented the labor market is.5 The less interchangeable different kinds of workers are—the more they 
are like engines and fuel—the less they compete, and the more segmented the overall job market. An 
immigration-induced jump in the supply of one kind of worker—say, men under 30 without a high school 
degree—will create competitive pressure primarily within that group. The depressive effect will hit fewer 
workers’ wages, but more acutely. 
1.2 The supply of capital 
At the macroeconomic level, labor and capital are partially substitutable and partially complementary. 
They are partially complementary because the most efficient way to make things almost always requires 
both labor and capital. To this extent, the arrival or workers should increase demand for capital, which will 
manifest initially as higher returns to investment. How quickly investors respond to that signal matters a 
 
5 But, as explained above, substitutability derives not only from the factor emphasized in this paragraph, 
heterogeneity among workers, but from complementary in production as well. 
Roodman, The domestic economic impacts of immigration 
   6 
lot for the overall economic impacts of immigration. 
Again the possibilities lie on a spectrum between extremes. Suppose that as the labor pool expands, capital 
does not—at least, not for several years. There are more workers, but no more buildings, factories, and 
computers for them to work in and with. In this case, we would expect the glut of workers to depress pay 
for everyone. In the US economy, the accepted rule of thumb among modelers is that a sudden, unexpected 
10% rise in labor supply reduces pay by 3% in the short term, which by definition is the period in which 
capital fails to respond to a labor expansion.6 The elasticities of substitution discussed in the previous 
subsection would still govern the relative distribution of impacts, that is, which workers’ pay would fall 
more than 3% and which less. 
But in the long run, history assures us, the capital supply will to a substantial degree expand to exploit the 
investment opportunities created by the arrival of workers. After all, the US labor pool has doubled many 
times since 1776, and capital has more than kept up. If capital supply is only a transient constraint on the 
economic absorption of workers, then we should expect the arrival of more workers to have zero average 
impact on wages in the long run. There will be more workers, more buildings, more factories, more 
computers, all producing things and selling labor at about the same prices—to more consumers. 
Notice that the first scenario is short-term and the second long-term. So the main practical question is not 
whether one scenario is right and the other wrong, but how short the short term is. How quickly do 
investors take advantage of an increment to labor? An ethical question also arises: Given our best estimate 
of adjustment speed, how much should we worry about short-term harm if the long-term harm is minimal? 
Unfortunately, the empirical question is hard to answer, for the same reason that the causes of economic 
growth are hard to determine. The nation becomes the unit of observation, and so many things vary 
simultaneously within and across nations that cause and effect are very hard to study statistically. 
Meanwhile, it is worth keeping in mind that for reasons outside of the conventional labor-capital dynamic, 
immigration could raise average wages. Some studies suggest that immigration, particularly of skilled 
workers, accelerates technological innovation, which is the basis of economic growth, and can lead to 
higher pay for large swaths of the workforce. Immigrants are notably important in computer-related 
industries. 
My sense is that in the flexible US economy, the long term capital response comes pretty quickly. Most 
wealthy nations have imported a lot of capital as well as labor in recent decades, indicating significant 
capacity for smooth absorption of immigrants into the economy. Immigration increases of the sort that 
could occur under realistic policy change would add up over time but be small and predictable on an 
annual basis. Even a doubling of US immigration from 1 million to 2 million/year would expand the US 
labor force by only 0.65%/year.7 And if the increased arrivals of new workers and consumers were 
predictable, investment patterns might effectively anticipate each year’s expansion, projecting this year’s 
 
6 The US economy is usually taken to be Cobb-Douglas, with total output 𝑌 = 𝐾𝛼𝐿1−𝛼 where 𝐾 is capital and 𝐿 is labor. 
A perfectly flexible, profit-maximizing economy will settle into an equilibrium where the pay to each factor equals its 
marginal value. In particular, with 𝐾 fixed, wages 𝑤 will be 𝜕𝑌/𝜕𝐿 = (1 − 𝛼)𝐾𝛼𝐿−𝛼 . The share of total earnings in 
economic output will then be 𝐿𝑤 𝑌⁄ = 𝐿(1 − 𝛼)𝐾𝛼𝐿−𝛼 𝐾𝛼𝐿1−𝛼⁄ = 1 − 𝛼. Economists observe that over many decades, 
US workers have taken home about 70% of national earnings (Ottaviano and Peri 2012, Fig 1), suggesting that 𝛼 ≈
0.3. So, under the model, the elasticity of wages with respect to labor supply will be 𝜕 ln 𝑤 𝜕 ln 𝐿⁄ =
𝜕 ln((1 − 𝛼)𝐾𝛼𝐿−𝛼) 𝜕 ln 𝐿⁄ = 𝜕[ln(1 − 𝛼) + 𝛼 ln 𝐾 − 𝛼 ln 𝐿] 𝜕 ln 𝐿⁄ = −𝛼 ≈ −0.3. 
7 The US labor force is 155 million workers. cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html. 
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growth based on last year’s. (The macroeconomic tradition of “rational expectations” asserts as much.) The 
comparatively benign “long run” would arrive immediately. 
On the other hand, while the hypothesis for a productivity bump from immigration is plausible, the 
evidence is weak (see below). As a result, the best anchoring assumption for the long-term response of 
national average wages to total labor supply looks to be not positive but zero (Card 2012, p. 211–12). 
2 Spatial studies that do not exploit natural experiments 
Cross-city and cross-region studies are akin to cross-country studies, which, as I explained in my review of 
the impacts of mortality on fertility, are now in disrepute. But analyzing within rather than across countries 
is more reliable because it shortens the list of potential confounders, factors left out of a model that could 
be simultaneously influencing the variables of interest. Iowa City is more like San Diego than Zimbabwe is 
like China because Iowa City and San Diego have long been subject to similar policies and economic 
conditions. To the extent that these deep traits are the same across cities, they cannot explain differences in 
immigration or wages or unemployment. 
Most spatial studies have found only small impacts of immigration on receiving geographies. Summarizing 
the literature to that time, Card (2001), p. 23, writes, “Typically, a 10-percentage-point increase in the 
fraction of immigrants (roughly the difference between Detroit and Houston) is estimated to reduce native 
wages by no more than 1 percentage point.” (Studies finding low impacts include Grossman (1982), Altonji 
and Card (1991); LaLonde and Topel (1991). On the other hand, Schoeni (1996) finds effects closer to 1:1.) 
However, spatial studies have been criticized for several shortcomings that could cause them to 
underestimate impacts (Chiswick 1991, p. 627–28; Borjas 1994, p. 1699). A first concern is that to lump an 
Indian computer programmer together with a Mexican farm worker is to obscure the texture of 
immigration’s impacts. Immigrants must be distinguished from each other at least by education level. The 
remaining concerns are, econometrically, of the kind mentioned just above—about potentially important 
confounders that are ignored. First, causality may go the other way, and with opposite sign. Maybe the 
dominant story is not that immigrants arriving in New York reduce wages there, but that a strong New 
York economy is lifting wages and attracting more immigrants. This positive relationship would not 
preclude a negative impact of immigration on wages, but it would obscure it. Second, if immigrants depress 
wages in a city, then some workers may move to other cities, depressing wages there too. And if wages fall 
everywhere at once, then comparing across cities will expose no effect. In other words, the labor market is 
open and national, not closed and local. Third, the same masking could occur through internal trade. A 
migrant influx could depress wages in a city’s labor-intensive, goods-producing businesses. Those 
businesses would lower their prices to undercut competitors in other cities, forcing the competitors to cut 
pay too. Again, the wage drop would be national, so cross-city comparisons would wrongly register no 
effect. Finally, if industrial patterns shift, then short-term depressive impacts could be missed in studies 
that look long term. If the arrival of migrants in certain cities depresses wages, it may attract businesses 
such as clothing manufacture that are sensitive to low-skill labor costs, or cause many industries to reverse 
automation (Lewis 2011). Added demand could eventually bring wages back to the old level. 
Perhaps the most sophisticated spatial study is Card (2001), which works to parry all these charges. 
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2.1 Card (2001), “Immigrant Inflows, Native Outflows, and the Local Market 
Impacts of Higher Immigration,” Journal of Labor Economics 
In truth, though I class this study as spatial, its unit of observation is not the city, but the city–occupation 
group combination. High-skill workers in Phoenix, say, are compared to low-skill ones in Boston and 
medium-skilled ones in Miami. 
In particular, Card divides occupations into six broad groups roughly stratified by skill level and pay. Group 
I, for example, consists of “laborers, farm workers, and low-skill service workers,” while Group VI is 
“professionals and technical workers.” Card views immigration into a city as a set of differentiated 
increases in the supplies of people statistically predicted to find employment in each group. Nationally in 
the late 1980s, for example, 39.2% of immigrants from Cuba were statistically expected, based on such 
traits as age, sex, and education, to work in Group I and only 8.3% in Group VI. For India, Pakistan, and 
Central Asia, the numbers are 21.9% and 28.0%. 
Notably, the trait of being a new or earlier immigrant only enters the model in this way. Despite differences 
in linguistic and cultural assimilation, not to mention legal status, an immigrant classed as Group I is 
viewed as economically interchangeable with a native in Group I. Immigration flows manifest as increases 
in a city’s stock of workers in each of the six occupation groups. 
Card’s empirical questions take the form: in 1990, in cities and occupation groups that since 1985 gained 
more people whose demographic traits statistically suit them for those groups, are employment and wages 
lower? How does the answer differ between natives and earlier immigrants, and between men and women? 
These differentiations answer the first criticism of spatial studies cited above, about treating immigrants as 
homogeneous. 
Card also takes on the endogeneity-related criticisms. In response to the first, that natives will undermine 
cross-city comparisons by fleeing, and thus spreading, low wages, Card checks whether that happens. 
According to his analysis of the 1990 US census, it does not (Card 2001, Table 4). If anything, cities that 
attracted more international immigration also attracted net domestic immigration. And to address the 
challenge that the same dissipation of apparent impacts could occur through intercity trade, Card studies 
short-term effects—from immigration during 1985–90 to employment outcomes on census day in 1990—
arguing that the trade effects could take a decade to kick in.8,9 
Finally, Card takes common steps to reduce endogeneity: adding controls and instrumenting. Looking 
across two dimensions of variation at once, place and occupation, allows Card to control for fixed effects 
associated with each dimension.10 For example, if there is something about New York that simultaneously 
attracts immigrants and raises wages in all occupation groups proportionally, this confounding is 
expunged. 
As for instrumenting, Card observes that new immigrants tend to go to the same cities as old ones, and 
where old ones went cannot be reversed-caused by labor market outcomes today. Card’s most rigorous 
regressions look at whether labor supply expansions attributable to historical immigration patterns are 
 
8 Thus the lag between immigration and measured impact ranges here between 0 and 5.25 years, averaging under 3. 
9 Studying Massachusetts after an unemployment spike circa 1990, Blanchard and Katz (1992, Fig. 7) find labor 
market adjustment to take 5–10 years. 
10 On “fixed effects” see the introduction of the section, “Cross-country panel studies,” in my review of the impacts of 
life-saving interventions on fertility (davidroodman.com/?p=422). 
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correlated with higher unemployment or lower wages for those already here. 
But I find this econometric step the weakest: dominant destinations for migration, such as New York, 
Florida, Texas, and California have differed systematically from the rest of the country for decades. They 
may possess deep, long-term traits that support economic growth and attract immigrants, so that a 
potentially misleading positive correlation between job market conditions and immigration still obscures 
the harm of immigration for some. 
That said, introducing Card’s instruments produces more negative results, suggesting that the instruments 
are doing their job, if perhaps imperfectly, removing the positively signed bias of reverse causation. 
Without instruments, a 10% increase in the number of people in a given city and occupation group is 
associated with a 0.28 percentage point drop in employment among men in that group (0.45 points among 
women). The drops just for employment of earlier immigrants are milder, at 0.19 and 0.23 points. (Card 
2001, Table 6, row A.) After instrumenting, the estimates are much larger: 2.02 and 0.81 points for male 
and female natives, 0.96 and 1.46 points for earlier immigrants (Card 2001, Table 6, row D). But the native–
earlier immigrant differences are not statistically significant. 
It bears emphasizing that the results for earlier immigrants do not arise from directly observing their 
employment experience. What is observed is that in given cities and occupation groups, employment is 
higher or lower by certain amounts, which are assumed the same for natives and earlier immigrants in the 
groups. Yet since natives and earlier immigrants are distributed differently across these groups, they are 
estimated to experience different employment changes on average. Some studies reviewed below assess 
impacts on earlier immigrants more directly, and thus more reliably. 
The pattern of estimated impacts on wages is less consistent than that for employment: for a 10% labor 
supply increase, the wage declines are 0.99% for male natives, 2.5% for female earlier immigrants, 
indistinguishable from zero for other groups (Card 2001, Table 7, row 4). 
Overall, while there is reason to worry that the study still underestimate the impacts (the instruments are 
not perfect), the results suggest that a 10% labor supply increase from immigration reduces employment 
and wages among those already in the labor force on the order of 2% in the short run. This finding of 
modest impact corroborates the large majority of spatial studies. 
2.2 Cortes (2008), “The Effect of Low‐Skilled Immigration on U.S. Prices: Evidence 
from CPI Data,” Journal of Political Economy 
Cortes (2008) is billed as a cross-city and cross-state examination of the impact of immigration on prices. 
Prices might seem distant from wages, but not those Cortes focuses on, which are for services such as such 
as childcare, housekeeping, gardening, dry cleaning, and shoe repair, the costs of which are dominated by 
low-skill wages. And the paper directly examines impacts on wages too. 
Like Card 1991 and many other spatial studies, Cortes (2008) instruments the immigration inflow with a 
prediction of that inflow based on past immigration patterns. And as in Card (2001), while the instrument 
is not beyond challenge, introducing it shifts the results in a direction that makes sense. Without the 
instrument, the correlation across US cities between low-skill immigration and prices for low-skill-
intensive services is mildly negative. With the instrument, the apparent impact of immigration on the 
studied prices rises three- to five-fold (Cortes 2008, Table 5). This suggests, plausibly, that low-skill 
immigrants move to cities where the prices for (and thus wages in) low-skill-intensive services are higher, 
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which positive correlation statistically masks any downward pressure the immigrants put on wages upon 
arrival. Evidently, instrumenting removes some or all of this effect. 
Also like Card 1991, Cortes checks whether the number of natives working in a city falls as immigrants 
arrive, and finds that it essentially does not. According to her regressions, each additional migrant to a city 
in 1980–2000 expanded the local labor force by 0.8–1.3 workers, net (Cortes 2008, Table 4, row 1). 
The pattern of results is persuasive in another way: the association of low-skill immigration with prices is 
weaker for services that require more skill or more natives, and disappears altogether for traded goods 
whose prices are largely set by world markets (Cortes 2008 Table 6). This pattern is consistent with 
immigration lowering just certain prices and is hard to explain with other causal stories. 
For a bottom-line figure, Cortes (2008), p. 401, estimates that in a representative US city, each 10% 
increase in the number of low-skill immigrants cut prices of low-skill-immigrant-intensive services by 
almost 2% (Cortes 2008, p. 401.). She corroborates with regressions estimating similar drops in wages for 
low-skill earlier immigrants, as well as for natives who resemble them in being Hispanic and non-English 
speaking. Wages for most low-skill natives, on the other hand, show no change. (Cortes 2008, Table 8 & 10.) 
Since the association with the wages of earlier immigrants is directly measured, not inferred as in Card 
(2001), the finding of greater impact on earlier immigrants is more reliable than Card (2001)’s more 
ambiguous findings on that score. The Cortes reading supports the belief that low-skill natives and 
immigrants are to a degree complementary in production, so that the competitive pressure of new 
immigrants concentrates on earlier ones. 
2.3 Peri, Shih, and Sparber (2014a), “Foreign STEM Workers and Native Wages and 
Employment in U.S. Cities,” working paper 
This study also fits firmly in the spatial tradition, comparing across US cities and instrumenting current 
migration patterns with past. It distinguishes itself by focusing on science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics (STEM) professionals. 
The study is clear-eyed about the difficulty of determining causality in this set-up and takes aggressive 
steps to test the robustness of its approach. To take one example of a concern combatted, perhaps cities 
with large stocks of college-educated workers have been more economically successful for decades, driving 
up wages and attracting more-skilled immigrants for a long time. This causal story would invalidate past 
immigration as an instrument. To check this possibility, Peri, Shih, and Sparber (2014a), p. 17, add a control 
for the city’s growth in college-educated natives; it does not undermine their results. 
Cutting against the study is the size of the estimated impacts. A 1 percentage point increase in a city’s 
growth of foreign STEM workers leads to a stunning 7–8% wage increase for natives (Peri, Shih, and 
Sparber 2014a, p. 3). As a result, immigration of STEM workers can explain 30–50% of all US productivity 
growth between 1990 and 2010! (Peri, Shih, and Sparber 2014a, p. 4.) 
Such results make it hard for me to dismiss the possibility that reverse- or third-variable causation is 
strongly at work. It is much easier to believe, for example, that a 7–8% wage increase for natives led to a 1 
percentage point increase in growth of STEM worker immigration. 
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2.4 Peri, Shih, and Sparber (2014b), “The Effects of Foreign Skilled Workers on 
Natives: Evidence from the H-1B Visa Lottery,” working paper 
Partnership for a New American Economy (PNAE) 2014, Closing Economic 
Windows: How H-1B Visa Denials Cost U.S.-Born Tech Workers Jobs and Wages 
during the Great Recession 
Peri, Shih, and Sparber’s second study attacks the same question as the first, but by trying to exploit a 
natural experiment, which is the random allocation of H-1B visas through a yearly government lottery. But 
I place the paper in this section because it appears not to be a natural experiment study in practice. 
Under the H-1B program, started in 1990, US employers wanting to hire skilled foreigners must apply for a 
visa for each slot they want to fill. The visas last three years and are renewable once. In 2004, the national 
visa cap fell back from the temporarily elevated level of 195,000/year to 65,000/year. As a consequence, in 
2007 and 2008, an average 88,693 visa applications/year, or 57.5%, were denied. Since the lottery was 
national, the denial percentage varied randomly by city. Peri, Shih, and Sparber study how this arbitrary 
allocation differentially affected pay for native computer workers in 2009–11. 
The prospect of exploiting “genuinely random variation” tantalizes. Unfortunately, in this case it also 
overpromises. The problem is that the treatment variable is the product of two factors, only which of is 
random—and it may be secondary mathematically. We can write the treatment variable like this: 
City's visa denial rate =
# of computer profession visas requested
# of computer professionals already in city
× % of visa requests denied 
Only the second term is random, and its value may not vary much. Why not? All applications faced the same 
denial probability and all cities had about the same share denied. 
In fact, by the law of large numbers, the more visas a city requested the more its denial rate converged to 
the national average of 57.5%. The city with the largest shock, for example, was Trenton, NJ, which had 
2,280 computer programmer visas denied on average in 2007–08, against an existing computer-related 
workforce of 6,148 (PNAE 2014, Table 1). The national denial rate of 57.5% implies that Trenton firms 
requested about 4,000 visas. Like a presidential poll of 4,000 people, the “margin of error” in Trenton’s 
lottery experience—the deviation of its denial rate from the national average—is pretty small: ±1.5%. That 
is, there is a 95% chance that Trenton’s denial rate was between 56% and 59%. (The actual rate cannot be 
determined from the figures displayed in the study reports.) 
In general, a city’s margin of error is approximately 1/√# of visa applications.11 For the average city, the 
margin of error is 3.8%, which is 6.6% of the average denial rate of 57.5%.12 So most cities’ denial rates 
clustered in a narrow band around the average. 
Meanwhile, the first term in the above formula varies much more in proportion to its mean. It runs as high 
 
11 If 𝑥𝑖  is the 0/1 denial outcome for visa application 𝑖, its variance is 𝐸[𝑥𝑖
2] − 𝐸[𝑥𝑖]
2 = .575 −. 5752. The variance of 
the average of 𝑁 uncorrelated draws 𝑥𝑖  is (. 575 − .5752) 𝑁⁄ , for a standard error of √(. 575 −. 5752) 𝑁⁄ . 95% 
confidence intervals are based on ±1.96 of these standard errors, ±1.96 × √(. 575 −. 5752) 𝑁⁄ = ±0.97 √𝑁⁄ . 
12 88,693 denials + 65,000 acceptances per 236 metropolitan areas = 651 applications/area. 0.97 √651⁄ = 0.038. 
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as 4,000/6,148 = 65% for Trenton to, presumably, close to zero for many metropolitan areas.13 It averages 
7.0%.14 As result, this nonrandom variation appears to dominate the seemingly randomized experiment. 
Peri, Shih, and Sparber find that by stunting the growth of technology companies, the 177,386 visa denials 
in 2007–08 cost US cities some 231,000 tech jobs for natives by 2010. And it reduced wages for natives 
with computer-related jobs by 4.9% (PNAE 2014, p. 5). 
Since the econometrics do not buttress their causal story the way true randomization would, we must think 
critically about the results. Could alternative theories explain the association between visa denials by city 
and lower employment and wages for natives? I think so. The nonrandom component in the visa denial 
equation above depends on the difference between the number of people a city’s computer-related 
companies want to hire and the number of potential workers who are available locally. Since local 
technology industry growth can be path dependent—it happens more where it has already happened, and 
computer workers may move to areas with a reputation for technology leadership—the local gap between 
computer workers needed and computer workers available could be significantly higher in places where 
the tech industry is attempting to grow above its historical rate. These could also be places where demand 
for computer professionals has historically been low, reducing their employment and wages (and the local 
cost of living) today. This story could explain the association between greater demand for H-1B visas, and 
thus greater exposure to visa denials, and lower employment and wages among natives. 
Meanwhile, apparently because of the reliance on the perceived randomized experiment, Peri, Shih, and 
Sparber (2014b) does not conduct the sort of aggressive robustness tests found in Peri, Shih, and Sparber 
(2014a), which might deprecate or rule out competing theories. 
2.5 Summary: spatial studies that do not exploit natural experiments 
Card (2001) provides credible corroboration of small, negative overall labor market impacts while 
significantly blunting the main criticisms of spatial studies. As for differences between natives and earlier 
immigrants, Cortes (2008) is most compelling because her estimate are based on more direct observations 
of these two groups. Overall, this sub-literature suggests that low-skill natives have little to lose from low-
skill immigration, but that earlier immigrants pay a price on the order of 2% for each immigration-induced 
10% increase in immigrant labor supply. 
3 Skill cell studies that do not exploit natural experiments 
Another major stream in the literature works purely with the variation across skill groups. Here, the unit of 
observation is the “skill cell,” the set of people across an entire country who have a certain degree of 
education and/or a certain length of experience in the workplace—these traits being major determinants 
of skill level and earnings. The empirical question becomes whether, on a nationwide basis, wages and 
employment for natives and earlier immigrants move differently in skill cells receiving more new 
immigrants. 
One attraction of the skill cell approach is that it surmounts some of the criticisms of spatial studies 
enumerated earlier. Recall that one criticism is that people can easily move from city to city, making 
intercity comparison potentially misleading. The equivalent in skill cell studies would be for people to 
 
13 Data are only reported for the 20 of the 236 metropolitan areas with the largest shocks (PNAE 2014, Table 1). 
14 153,693 applications against a computer-related workforce of 2,188,258 (PNAE 2014, Table 1, last row). 
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suddenly gain more years of work experience, which they can’t, or earn a GED or college degree, which they 
can do only with difficulty. To the extent that people are stuck in their cells, the wage and employment 
effects of new arrivals are less apt to be masked by compensating shifts on the part of those already in the 
domestic labor market. (On the other hand, Card (2001) and Cortes (2008) didn’t find much spatial 
movement either.) 
However, skill cell studies have an important weakness. Because they view the national economy as 
integrated, not as a set of discrete metropolises or states, it is hard for them to estimate the overall 
relationship between labor supply and wages. They cannot ask whether wages were depressed in cities 
where the workforce grew faster—a question that might be answered by comparing data for 100–200 
cities. They can only ask, when the national labor supply went up, did wages rise or fall? In trying to answer 
this question, there would be only one, national data point per time period to work with—and many 
theories competing to explain it. Moving from decennial census data to annual data would not help much, 
because successive years are not statistically independent. The US in 1960 was a lot like the US in 1959. 
As a result, in interpreting skill cell studies, it is essential to distinguish between relative effects and 
absolute averages. One must bring to the studies an assumption about absolute average wage impacts—for 
which, as argued earlier, zero is probably a good guess especially after a few years to give investors time to 
adjust. The skill cell regressions can only speak to redistribution, to whether the impacts of immigration 
are concentrated or diffuse. They can speak, for example, to whether immigration increases inequality by 
widening the pay gap between those who have spent time in college and those who have not. 
The skill cell literature has been particularly disputatious. Most of the arguments are over which elasticities 
of substitution should figure in economic models—those between natives and immigrants, perhaps, or the 
less- or more-educated, or the less- or more-experienced—and over how best to estimate them. 
Researchers have also differed in their interpretive emphasis of the short term versus the long term, the 
latter being more optimistic in its allowance for capital adjustment. 
3.1 Borjas (2003), “The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping: Reexamining 
the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 
Borjas (2014), Immigration Economics, chapter 5 
Viewing the economy as a giant production process, every input has an elasticity of substitution with 
respect to every other. In order to tame that complexity, when labor economists study the impacts of 
immigration, they work with a few abstract categories. There is capital, which embraces all investment in 
tangible and intangible assets, and there is labor. Labor is typically subdivided according to the education 
level of workers and their years of experience, on the idea that learning occurs both before after entering 
the work force. Borjas (2003), for example, distinguishes four education groups—people who did not 
complete high school, who completed just high school, who had some college, or who completed college—
and eight experience levels—1–5 years, 6–10 years, …, up to 36–40. Borjas (2014) further divides 
“completed college” into “college graduate” and “post-graduate.” 
Even these 1 + 4 × 8 = 33 or 1 + 5 × 8 = 41 input categories produce unmanageable complexity, for 
among them are 528–820 possible elasticities of substitution.15 To simplify matters, economists may 
impose additional assumptions by creating a hierarchy (Card and Lemieux 2001). Borjas (2003) introduced 
 
15 From 33 categories, 32 × 33/2 = 52832 × 33/2 = 528 pairwise selections are possible. For 41, 820 are possible. 
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this idea to the study of immigration. 
As already hinted, Borjas starts by taking the most fundamental split as being between labor and capital. 
The substitutability between labor and capital is one influence on wages, and like the overall relationship 
between labor supply and wages, the interplay between labor and capital is hard to determine from 
national-level data. So an assumption about it too must come from outside of skill cell empirics. 
Within labor, Borjas’s next split is by education level. The degrees of substitutability among the four or five 
education groups are assumed to be all the same—so high school drop-outs compete with or complement 
high school graduates precisely as much as they do with college graduates.16 In the same way, education 
groups are subdivided into experience subgroups, which are again assumed to compete equally among 
each other. 
These simplifications no doubt do violence to reality. But they allow economists to estimate 
complementarity effects—how low-skill immigration can benefit high-skill workers and vice versa. In 
contrast, some studies ignore these positive complementarities across skill groups, looking only at the 
negative competitive effects within groups. 
All this structure reduces Borjas’s task to estimating just two elasticities of substitution: across education 
groups; and, within education groups, across experience groups. This he does using Census Bureau data for 
1960–2000 (updated to 2010 in Borjas 2014). Concretely, for each combination of education level, 
experience level, and census round between 1960 and 2000 or 2010, Borjas averages wages and person-
weeks worked nationwide. This distills a massive database down to just 160 data points (240 in Borjas 
(2014)).17  
The analysis proceeds in several steps that are too complex to fully explain here, which have the effect of 
climbing the hierarchical structure stepwise from the bottom. The first step estimates the bottom-most 
elasticity of substitution, between different experience groups within education groups, e.g., between 
college graduates with 6–10 years of work experience and college graduates with 11–15. It regresses 
wages for each education-experience group on total hours worked by that group in the given census year 
(both variables in logarithms), while including dummies dictated by the model to capture certain fixed 
effects. (The appendix below has more detail.) 
For all the conceptual superstructure, the standard worries about reverse and third-variable causation 
pertain, as emphasized in Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson (2012). The assumption is made that labor supply 
and wages are linked though only one causal channel, running from labor supply to wages.18 So while we 
should not dismiss the results out of hand, we should recognize that robust theoretical motivation does not 
inoculate the regressions against the usual econometric worries. 
Borjas (2003) estimates the elasticity of substitution between different experience classes within an 
 
16 Ottaviano and Peri (2012, p. 184), experiment with inverting the hierarchical relationship of education and 
experience and allowing different substitutability between high drop-outs and graduates on the one hand and those 
with some college and full college on the other (their “Model B”). They find that the data oppose the first change and 
support the second. 
17 The latter gains an education category, as noted, and 2010 census data. 
18 However, because the included dummies for each survey-education combination and each education-experience 
combination can soak up any endogeneity that is fixed within each of either of those groups, some competing causal 
stories are countenanced and removed. 
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education class at 3.5, and that between education classes at 1.35 (Borjas 2003, eqs. 16 & 17).19 By the 
standards of this literature, these numbers are rather low. (They can go as low as 0 and as high as infinity.) 
They indicate that workers of different education and experience levels do not easily substitute for each 
other. Rather, to a significant extent, differently skilled workers seem to compete in different labor 
markets, so that the competitive wage effects of an influx of inexperienced, minimally educated immigrants 
will tend to concentrate among already-arrived workers of the same skill class. Workers in complementary, 
more-skilled groups will tend to benefit, just as would-be restaurant managers can benefit from the 
appearance of more kitchen workers. 
Borjas (2003) uses these results to estimate the impacts of actual US immigration during 1980–2000 (see 
Table 1). This influx was barbell-shaped—largest at the least- and most-skilled ends. Importantly, and 
somewhat oddly, Borjas estimates the short-term impacts of this long-term development. That is, he 
assumes that the capital stock does not expand at all in response to the new workers. Since the inflow 
equaled about 10.7% of the US workforce, overall wages fall by assumption by 0.3 × 10.7% = 3.2%. (The 
subsection above on “The supply of capital” discusses the origin of the 0.3 multiplier.) Around that average 
of –3.2%, the drop was greatest in the education classes receiving proportionally more immigrants. 
Workers at the ends of the education spectrum experienced more added competition and benefited less 
from complementarity with new arrivals in other education classes; their wages are estimated to have 
fallen more than –3.2% (See first two columns of Table 1.) 
Borjas updates this analysis in a June 2014 book (Borjas 2014). He appears to make two major changes: 
adding 2010 census data, and simulating full capital adjustment as well as no capital adjustment. Perhaps 
because of the additional data, the elasticity estimates rise: 6.7 instead of 3.5 across experience classes, 5.0 
instead of 1.35 across education classes. This implies that the wage impacts of new arrivals are more evenly 
spread across all workers. Meanwhile, allowing capital to fully adjust adds 3.2% to all wages. As a result, 
the 8.9% drop for the least-skilled in Borjas (2003) becomes a 6.2% or 3.1% drop in Borjas (2014) (see last 
two columns of Table 1). 
TABLE 1. ESTIMATES OF THE WAGE IMPACTS BY EDUCATION CLASS OF US IMMIGRATION 
 
19 The elasticity of 1.35 suggests, for example, that if immigration swelled the ranks of workers without a high school 
degree by 1% relative to those with, then the wages of below-high school workers would fall by 1 1.35⁄ × 11 1.35⁄ × 1 
relative to above–high school ones. 
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 Immigration-
induced rise in 
hours worked 
 Estimated wage impact 
   Borjas 2003  
Ottaviano & 
Peri 2012 
 
Borjas 2014 
Years 1990–2010  1980–2000  1990–2006  1990–2010 
Capital stock adjusts to more labor?  No  Yes  No Yes 
Nativity of workers affected   Native  Native Foreign  Native 
          
Education level          
No degree +25.9%  –8.9%  +1.7% –8.1%  –6.2% –3.1% 
High school degree +8.4%  –2.6%  +0.6% –12.6%  –2.7% +0.4% 
Some college +6.1%  –0.3%  +1.2% –2.2%  –2.3% +0.9% 
College graduate +10.9%  
–4.9%  0.0% –5.5%  
–3.2% –0.1% 
Post-graduate +15.0%    –4.1% –0.9% 
Overall +10.6%  –3.2%  +0.6% –6.7%  –3.2% 0.0% 
Table shows estimated impacts of immigration on the wages of workers already in the US labor force. 
Borjas 2003 and Ottaviano & Peri 2012 group together college graduates and post-graduates. 
Sources: Borjas 2003, Table IX; Ottaviano & Peri 2012, Table 6, col 7; Borjas 2014, Table 5.3. 
3.2 Ottaviano and Peri (2012), “Rethinking the Effect of Immigration on Wages,” 
Journal of the European Economic Association 
Ottaviano and Peri (2012) (OP) elaborate on Borjas (2003) in several ways. They update the data from 
2000 to 2006 (between censuses, the Census Bureau conducts other representative surveys). They allow 
the substitutability between the lower two education categories (those with or without a high school 
degree) to differ from that between the better-educated (some college or college graduate), the intuition 
being that today high school drop-outs can fill about the same economic roles as high-school graduates 
while the same cannot be said for community college graduates and PhD’s. Most important, OP expand the 
Borjas (2003) hierarchy at the bottom, splitting between native and foreign-born workers. 
The significance of the native-immigrant split can be seen in the restaurant example: by not splitting 
natives and foreign-born, Borjas (2003) treats them as perfect substitutes: immigrants can wait tables too, 
if perhaps not quite as efficiently as natives. But perhaps, OP suggest, that is wrong. Perhaps new 
immigrants sometimes play distinct roles in production, for lack of linguistic and cultural assimilation and 
possibly legality. In this case, the competitive effect of new immigrants will concentrate to some degree 
among earlier immigrants, and natives will be partly shielded. Natives might even benefit on net because of 
complementarity: cheaper kitchen workers means more restaurants, which means more jobs for wait staff. 
Ottaviano and Peri (2012), p. 156, estimate the elasticity of substitution between immigrants and natives at 
about 20. This means that a 20% increase in immigrants per native reduces the pay of immigrants relative 
to natives by 1%. Rerunning the regression after splitting the sample at the high school graduation line 
produces a native-immigrant elasticity of 11.1 among those only a high school degree or less, and 33 for 
those with more; the latter estimate is statistically indistinguishable from infinity (Ottaviano and Peri 2012, 
p. 185). This suggests, plausibly, that educated immigrants and natives are more interchangeable than their 
less-educated counterparts. Probably educated immigrants arrive better able to function in American 
language and culture; and probably any limitations in this regard matter less to their employers if, for 
example, the immigrants code well. 
Even the native-foreigner elasticity of 11.1 within the less-educated, though not Borjas (2003)’s assumed 
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value of infinity, is pretty high: evidently low-skill immigrants visit only a bit more competition on earlier 
migrants than on natives. Perhaps the difference is small because OP’s immigrant group contains all 
foreign-born workers, including those who have had decades to assimilate to the point where they differ 
little as workers from natives. At any rate, immigration has so dramatically expanded the ranks of foreign-
born laborers in the US in recent decades that even this low incremental impact adds up. According to the 
OP data, hours worked by foreign born without a high school degree increased 125% between 1990 and 
2006.20 The result, in the OP assessment, was relatively intense cumulative pressure on pre-1990 
arrivals—roughly, a 125%/11.1 drop in their earnings relative to new arrivals. 
In OP’s simulations, excerpted in Table 1, the resulting native–foreign-born split is clear. They estimate that 
natives experienced no wage falls, but that earlier immigrants saw drops of 2.2–12.6%. The impact 
estimates average zero across all groups because capital is assumed to adjust to labor expansion rather 
than being a bottleneck to labor absorption as in Borjas (2003). 
Table 1 contains an irony. While OP are generally seen as the immigration optimists in their debate with 
Borjas and colleagues, their results are more negative in the sense of indicating more concentrated harm on 
a vulnerable group, previous immigrants. OP see worse impacts on inequality. 
3.3 Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson (2012), “Comment: On Estimating Elasticities of 
Substitution,” Journal of the European Economic Association 
Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson (2012) (BGH) replicate and critique Ottaviano and Peri (2012). The final 
versions of both papers appear in the February 2012 issue of the Journal of the European Economic 
Association, capping a long back-and-forth between the parties. Evidently Borjas and colleagues perceived 
OP, with their optimism about the impacts on native workers, as a misguided dissent from Borjas (2003). 
I have run and pondered the code behind OP, BGH, and the Borjas (2014) update to Borjas (2003). I think 
that the BGH critique raises some good questions about the fragility of OP’s novel results. But the 
arguments are also overdrawn. And to the extent they hold, they damage not just OP, but the whole skill 
cell approach initiated by Borjas (2003). The appendix provides a full, technical discussion. 
At base, the two sides differ on two important questions, and on both I find the OP view more realistic. The 
first is the issue already discussed about how fast the capital stock responds to labor expansion. Borjas 
(2003) accentuates the pessimistic short-term perspective, and BGH endorses it through silence on the 
issue. OP focus on the long-term, in which capital adjusts, and which seems more relevant when 
immigration is steady. (Borjas (2014) is more even-handed, doing both.) 
The second issue is the reliability of the OP finding of modest native-immigrant complementarity, which 
implies better outcomes for natives and worse for earlier immigrants. 
The strongest BGH criticism launches from a point I explained in reviewing Borjas (2003), that for all the 
theoretical superstructure, one can debate whether the econometrics attack endogeneity aggressively 
enough with controls and instruments. BGH observe that adding dummies for a large set of fixed effects to 
the OP regressions greatly widens the confidence intervals around the estimate of native-immigrant 
substitutability, to the point where one can no longer reject perfect substitutability. After all, maybe new 
 
20 Figure obtained by loading the OP Stata data file “supply_groups_60_06_specification_1.dta” 
(webcitation.org/6RMHAjv1M) and typing “table year if year==1990 | year==2006, c(sum howo_ma_for sum 
howo_fe_for)”, which produces 1990 and 2006 total hours worked by foreign-born males and females. 
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immigrants put as much competitive pressure on natives as on earlier immigrants. 
I take that point seriously, but also see issues. First, in imposing that standard of rigor on OP, BGH do not 
acknowledge that the OP regressions are already more rigorous than the corresponding ones in Borjas 
(2003) (and now in Borjas (2014), ch. 5). Second, for reasons laid out in the appendix below, in augmenting 
the OP regressions in order to rule out other causal theories, BGH abandon the original hierarchical 
construct. Imposing the BGH standard of rigor on the Borjas works and OP robs all the regressions of 
theoretical meaning. The coefficients become generic elasticities, not clearly associated with education or 
experience or nativity groups. And in the case of Borjas (2014), this generic elasticity is about 14, higher 
than the values reported in Borjas (2014), and implying more evenly spread impacts from immigration. 
On the crucial question of immigrant-native substitutability, where does the truth lie? As usual we cannot 
be certain. The economic story we are interested in and competing stories we want to rule out can have 
effects on immigrant-native wage differences that are about the same within each education class and 
decade or each experience class and decade. All fall out of the analysis when BGH’s extra dummies are 
added. If competing stories are at work, that will be enough for the regressions to bestow explanatory 
power on the dummies, arguing for their retention. What statistical tests cannot tell is whether the story of 
interest is also being expunged. 
Since skill cell studies cannot assure us as to the truth, we must judge the probabilities as best we can by 
drawing in part on knowledge from outside these studies. Peri and Sparber (2009), reviewed just below, 
back the suggestion of imperfect substitutability by documenting that among low-skill workers, foreign-
born ones work more in occupations such as construction that demand more physical skill and less 
communication skill. Friedberg (2001), one of the most credible studies in this review, finds that the 
massive influx of Russian Jews into Israel in the early 1990s boosted the earnings of those already in the 
Israeli workforce, again suggesting complementarity. And Cortes (2008), already reviewed, finds greater 
impacts on earlier immigrants. 
Thus it seems likely that immigrants, especially recent ones, substitute imperfectly for natives. That may be 
good news for natives, but it is bad news for earlier immigrants. 
3.4 Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth (2012), “The Impact of Immigration on 
the Structure of Wages: Theory and Evidence from Britain,” Journal of the 
European Economic Association 
Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth (2012) apply methods similar to OP’s to data from the UK for the 
period from the mid-1970s to the mid-2000s. They find less substitutability than OP between immigrants 
and natives, which is to say, more complementarity between them. Their preferred estimate for the 
substitutability parameter is about 7.8, compared to OP’s 20 (Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth 2012, 
p. 134). This suggests that in Britain the competitive effect of new arrivals concentrated even more on 
earlier immigrants, to the relative benefit of natives. 
3.5 Summary: skill cell studies that do not exploit natural experiments 
Skill cell studies arose in reaction to perceived limitations of spatial studies. Surprisingly, they seem to have 
done more damage to themselves than to the spatial literature, which has responded reasonably strongly to 
the methodological critiques levelled at them. If one trusts the theory-disciplined skill method, then the 
pattern of results in OP looks about right, with impacts concentrated on previous immigrants. If one joins 
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BGH in demanding much higher rigor, then about all we can say is that they produce no evidence that 
average effects are negative (for they cannot) and little evidence that the effects are concentrated among 
certain kinds of workers. 
4 A study of immigrant-native complementarity 
Peri and Sparber (2009), “Task Specialization, Immigration, and Wages,” 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 
In reviewing the debate between Borjas, Peri, and their colleagues, I favored the Ottaviano and Peri (2012) 
view that natives and immigrants are probably not perfect substitutes, if only because natives’ assimilation 
better suits them for some jobs. Peri and Sparber (2009) backs this common sense with systematic 
analysis. It is a spatial study with the unit of geography being the US state. It examines whether 
immigration leads natives to congregate more in occupations that demand more communication skill than 
physical skill, which would make sense since natives have a comparative advantage in communication in 
most parts of the country. 
I have explained why spatial studies face challenges in discerning causality, and why the instruments 
typically used in them to improve matters, based on past migration patterns or (in this case) proximity to 
the US-Mexico border, are useful but not foolproof. Those concerns apply fully to the paper at hand. Indeed, 
contrary to a statement in the paper, econometric tests strongly challenge the validity of the instruments.21  
Yet two features of the study lend it credibility. First, like Cortes (2008), its theory generates a set of 
intuitive predictions, all of which are borne out by the data, and which together seem best explained by the 
theory. In particular, states receiving more low-skill immigrant labor should see: 
• For native and immigrant workers as a group, more labor in jobs demanding physical skill. After all, 
if the main effect of low-skill immigration is to expand the pool of workers suitable for such work, 
the economy should adjust to at least partially absorb them. 
• But in response to the increased supply, wages for jobs demanding physical skill should fall relative 
to wages for jobs emphasizing communications skill. 
• Following the money, and playing to their strengths, domestic workers should move more into 
communication-intensive professions. Thus the shift for this subgroup should be opposite that of 
the labor pool as a whole (see point 1). 
The study’s second strength is that, because the theory relates to how factors of production (different kinds 
of labor) compete in markets, it remains true even if causation runs in reverse, as will be explained just 
 
21 The instrumented regressions are overidentified, so the paper reports overidentification-based instrument validity 
tests and takes reassurance from them. However, the reasoning is problematic in several ways. First, inspection of the 
paper’s code clarifies that the tests are only run for some of the regressions, e.g., in Table 2, only for those in the first 
row. Second, the test performed assumes homoskedasticity (Wooldridge 2002, p. 123), but the regression errors are 
clustered by state. Cluster-robust Hansen tests (Wooldridge 2002, p. 201) that I ran generally return worse results, 
most below 𝑝 = 0.1. Finally, even if the reported test results are taken at face value, the fact that all those reported 
exceed 0.1 is less reassuring than the paper suggests. For example, pp values of 0.14 and 0.11 (Table 2, cols. 3 & 4) 
mean that if the instruments are valid, there is only a 14% or 11% chance of obtaining a test statistic as large as the 
ones actually obtained. If the purpose is to reach policy-relevant conclusions with confidence, those are low 
probabilities. 
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below. 
All of the predicted patterns manifest strongly in the data (Peri and Sparber 2009, Tables 2 & 3). No doubt 
endogeneity is present even in the instrumented regressions (see my footnote 21). But that is less of a 
threat than usual because the theory is reversible. As in an animation of planets orbiting in reverse, the 
same laws of motion apply. If causation runs the other way too, it still indicates complementarity between 
immigrants and natives. The theoretical sequence would begin with disproportionate growth in industries 
demanding communication skills. This would raise wages for those skills relative to manual labor, and 
draw natives into those professions. This would secondarily increase demand for manual labor, which 
would attract immigrants with a comparative advantage in that work. 
Given the strong match between the data and the subtle and complex predictions, and the consequent 
difficulty of explaining them with parsimonious alternative theories, the study lends credence to the view 
that natives and immigrants are not economically interchangeable, thus that the impacts of immigration 
concentrate to some degree on previous immigrants. 
It should be noted that one trait that economically differentiates some migrants—being undocumented—is 
implicitly taken as fixed here but is in fact subject to policy. An expansion of legal immigration could affect 
not only the quantity of immigrants but the parameters that determine their impact on other workers. They 
might move more easily into customer-facing, communication-intensive professions. 
5 Studies of wage and employment impacts exploiting natural experiments 
The studies reviewed to this point look at correlations over years or decades between immigration, wages, 
and employment. Even those that instrument immigrant inflows are open to the standard criticism of 
endogeneity, that other dynamics explain the results found. For this reason, other studies exploit natural 
experiments: sudden, large influxes of workers. Even these are not beyond the standard doubts. E.g., the 
wave of Portuguese repatriates from Angola and Mozambique in the mid-1970s coincided with major 
economic and political changes in Portugal (Carrington and de Lima 1996). But natural experiment–based 
studies hold the promise of moving a step closer to the experimental ideal, and that promise should be 
investigated. 
5.1 Card (1990), “The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market,” 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 
Between April and October 1980 roughly 125,000 Cubans left home for Florida, on just about anything that 
could float. Perhaps half the immigrants settled in Miami, whose labor force they augmented by some 7% 
(Card 1990, p. 247–48). The Cuban government determined the start and the end of the episode. So the 
immigrants were not drawn out of Cuba by a sudden labor shortage in Miami—reverse causation that 
would have compromised the quality of the natural experiment. 
Card (1990) examines the effects of this shock by comparing changes in wages and unemployment in 
Miami to those in Atlanta, Houston, Los Angeles, and Tampa–St. Petersburg, cities that received negligible 
numbers of Cubans in 1980. Card chose the comparator cities as similar to Miami in reliance on immigrants 
in the labor force, and in their patterns of economic development, as gauged by year-to-year employment 
growth circa 1980. The study fits into the spatial literature since it compares cities, while standing out in 
the suddenness of the migration inflow studied. 
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The conclusion is straightforward: the Mariel Boatlift had no discernible impact on wages and 
unemployment among those already in Miami. The main effect found is a drop in wages for Cubans in 
Miami—but that average includes the new arrivals and is about what would be expected given their 
number, relative youth, lack of education, and, thus, lower earning power (Card 2001, p. 254). Among 
blacks, a disproportionately low-skill group that might have been especially vulnerable to the extra 
competition for jobs, wages did not change relative to the control cities; and unemployment among blacks 
if anything improved in 1980. In 1982, unemployment among blacks did rise more in Miami than in the 
comparator cities, but given the timing that probably had much more to do with the dynamics of the deep 
1981–82 recession. 
Card (1990), p. 257, conjectures that Miami was unusually well prepared to absorb the influx because its 
economy already made disproportionate use of low-skill labor, thanks to earlier waves of immigration. 
Local industry such as textiles and apparel may have been able to expand quickly. That is a caution against 
generalization to the rest of the US or other countries. 
Card (1990)’s most rigorous findings, such as those just cited on unemployment among blacks, are called 
“differences in differences.” They are differences across cities in changes over time, which are themselves 
before-after differences. In a pedagogic article on methods in labor economics, the respected empiricists 
Joshua Angrist and Alan Krueger cite Card (1990) as an example of differences-in-differences (Angrist and 
Krueger 1999, Table 2). They also play off of Card’s use of the method to illustrate its limitations: 
In the summer of 1994, tens of thousands of Cubans boarded boats destined for Miami in an 
attempt to emigrate to the United States in a second Mariel Boatlift that promised to be 
almost as large as the first one….Wishing to avoid the political fallout that accompanied the 
earlier boatlift, the Clinton Administration interceded and ordered the Navy to divert the 
would-be immigrants to a base in Guantanamo Bay. Only a small fraction of the Cuban 
emigres ever reached the shores of Miami. Hence, we call this event, “The Mariel Boatlift That 
Did not Happen.” (Angrist and Krueger 1999, p. 1328) 
Angrist and Krueger repeat some of Card’s difference-in-difference analysis but centering on 1994 rather 
than 1980. Taking their results at face value, the “The Mariel Boatlift That Did not Happen” increased 
joblessness among blacks in Miami because their unemployment rate jumped from 10.1% to 15.1% 
between 1993 and 1994, even as the corresponding rate fell from 11.5% to 10.9% in the comparator cities. 
Of course, forces other than the immigration non-event must have caused that spike in joblessness. 
Thus natural experiments are never perfect. The lesson for interpreting Card (1990) is that the actual 
Mariel boatlift may have raised unemployment among those already working in Miami, if this effect was 
coincidentally offset by unrelated economic developments. 
Still, Occam’s razor favors the simpler explanation, which is that immigration had little effect. Notably, 
Krueger later argued strongly for this view: 
The best available evidence does not support the view that large waves of immigrants in the 
past have had a detrimental effect on the labor market opportunities of natives, including the 
less skilled and minorities. Any claim that increased immigration…will necessarily reduce the 
wages of incumbent workers should be viewed as speculation with little solid research support. 
(Krueger 2006) 
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The first item in the “best available evidence” that Krueger invokes is Card (1990).22  
5.2 Hunt (1992), “The Impact of the 1962 Repatriates from Algeria on the French 
Labor Market,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 
When Algeria won independence from France in 1962, 900,000 ethnic French (pieds-noirs) repatriated to 
the motherland; their number was equivalent to 1.6% of France’s labor force as of the next census in 1968. 
The repatriates resettled disproportionately in the south of France because its climate felt more like home 
(Hunt 1992, p. 556). The cross-province differences in resettlement rates created a natural experiment, 
which Hunt (1992) analyzes. Most of her follow-up data are from the 1968 census, so the impacts studied 
are considered medium- to long-term. 
Overall, the study is less relevant to our interest than Card (1990) and less compelling. It is less relevant 
because the immigrants were more skilled on average than the receiving population (Hunt 1992, p. 557–
58). No popular theory suggests that skilled immigration threatens the less-skilled who are our primary 
concern. These immigrants also probably assimilated more easily than most immigrants, meaning that they 
more perfectly substituted for, and competed with, native workers. That said, the inflow included low-skill 
workers too, so harm could be revealed for their native counterparts. And even a finding that the high-
skilled immigration reduced employment or wages among already arrived counterparts would reveal 
something about the general economics of immigration. 
At any rate, the study is less compelling because the “natural experiment” is less arbitrary. Since the 
immigrants favored the south and the impacts studied are longer-term, systematic north-south differences 
in economic development within France in the 1960s might explain the findings. “The general fall in 
unemployment from 1954 to 1962 and the rise in unemployment from 1962 to 1968 were particularly 
marked in the departments of the south.” (Hunt 1992, p. 566.) Probably immigration was at most a 
secondary contributor to those trends. Indeed, provinces receiving more repatriates saw unemployment 
among non-repatriates rise more during 1962–68 (differences-in-differences regressions, Hunt (1992), 
Table 3, cols 3–4), which is what we would expect if disproportionate receipt of repatriates were 
coincidentally aligning with broader economic trends.23  
Hunt finds large effects: the 1.6% labor expansion increased unemployment by up to 0.2 percentage points 
and cut wages by 0.51–0.80% (Hunt 1992, p. 566, 568). The upper bound of the wage impact implies a 2:1 
ratio between labor supply growth and wage decline. But because the quality of the experiment seems low, 
I cannot confidently interpret these coefficients as causal. 
5.3 Carrington and de Lima (1996), “The Impact of 1970s Repatriates from Africa 
on the Portuguese Labor Market,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 
Carrington and de Lima (1996) is a close cousin of Hunt (1992) in title, journal, and source of identifying 
variation, looking at Portugal rather than France. However, the flow of retornados dwarfed the flow of 
pieds-noirs as a share of the receiving population. After Angola and Mozambique achieved independence in 
the mid-1970s, enough Portuguese repatriated to expand the country’s labor force 10% in just three years. 
Like their French counterparts, they were better educated on average than the receiving population 
 
22 He also cites Hunt (1992) and Friedberg (2001), both reviewed just below. 
23 The regression in Table 3, col 4, is instrumented, but the instruments fail a validity test (Hunt 1992, p. 565). 
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(Carrington and de Lima 1996, p. 335). 
Despite the magnitude of the immigration shock, Carrington and de Lima express humility about their 
ability to trace its consequences: 
…certain characteristics of Portugal in the 1970s make [the retornados immigration] a less-than-ideal 
natural experiment. First, Portuguese labor market statistics are certainly not as detailed and perhaps 
not as accurate as those of more developed countries such as France and the United States. More serious 
is the fact that the same years in which the immigration occurred brought the revolutionary end of a 
right-wing dictatorship in Portugal, the end of a colonial war, the nationalization of several industries, 
several labor market reforms, and a Europe-wide recession; it could therefore be that changes in the 
Portuguese economy over this period are not attributable to the retornados. (Carrington and de Lima 
1996, p. 331) 
Carrington and de Lima estimate the impacts in two ways: by comparing Portugal to France and, especially, 
Spain using national-level statistics; and by comparing across the departments within Portugal. In the latter 
case, data limitations force them to look only at wages in the construction industry. 
Graphical comparisons show that Portugal paralleled France and Spain economically in the 1970s, with 
unemployment staying low until mid-decade, then climbing substantially. However, unemployment 
climbed sooner in Portugal, which might be a fingerprint of the retornados. (See Figure 1.) Corresponding 
time series regressions find that an additional immigration flow equal to 1% of the workforce was followed 
a year later by a 0.3% unemployment increase (Carrington and de Lima 1996, Table 4, col 2). These 
regressions control for the Spanish unemployment rate in an attempt to remove the effect of the mid-1970s 
European economic downturn. However, as with wages in Miami, the unemployment effects can be 
mathematically explained by high unemployment purely among the new arrivals. And separate regressions 
find that immigration was followed by a slight increases in earnings (Carrington and de Lima 1996, Table 4, 
col 6). 
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FIGURE 1. UNEMPLOYMENT IN FRANCE, PORTUGAL, AND SPAIN (CARRINGTON AND DE LIMA 1996, FIG 3, PANEL 
A)  
Carrington and de Lima (1996) put even less weight on their within-Portugal, cross-department 
regressions. These show that wages rose less where population grew faster. However, Carrington and de 
Lima explain that the results appear driven by three outliers, all of which suffered economic hardships 
separate from immigration. Lisbon and nearby Setúbal “were the sites of the most dramatic political and 
economic conflicts during the mid-1970s. In addition, Setubal was the site of oil price–sensitive industries 
such as refining and ship-building” which were hit hard by the 1973–74 oil shock. Faro, at the country’s 
coastal southern tip, suffered especially from the drop in tourism. Dropping these three, out of 18 
departments, “shows a much weaker relationship between immigration and wages,” although the authors 
do not report the precise effect. (Carrington and de Lima 1996, p. 343–44.) 
Again, we find no strong suggestion of harmful side effects from immigration, which is perhaps 
unsurprising given the relative skill and ease of assimilation of the retornados. 
5.4 Friedberg (2001), “The Impact of Mass Migration on the Israeli Labor Market,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 
Beating out Portugal in the World Cup of immigration shocks is Israel, which accepted Russian Jews 
equivalent in number to 12% of its population in the early 1990s. As in Portugal and France, but not Miami, 
the immigrants were relatively skilled, being both educated and experienced on average (Friedberg 2001, 
p. 1387). Unlike the studies of those events, Friedberg (2001) discerns impacts by looking at differences 
across occupations, not geographies. Did wages rise more slowly in the job types receiving the most 
newcomers? 
That question is laden with potential for reverse causation since the immigrants did on average move into 
less-skilled, lower-paying jobs as they entered the Israeli economy at lower rungs. If occupations with 
Roodman, The domestic economic impacts of immigration 
   25 
lower pay also saw lower wage growth—if the wage premium for skilled professions widened in Israel in 
the 1990s—that would create the appearance of immigration slowing wage growth. 
A strength of Friedberg (2001) is the use of a credible instrument for the share of workers in each 
occupation who were new immigrants, and it is made possible by Friedberg’s decision to analyze across 
occupations rather than geographies. For each two-digit occupation code and year, the instrument is the 
number of émigrés who worked in that occupation before they left Russia, taken as a share of Israel’s pre-
inflow stock of workers in that occupation. Since both the top and bottom of that ratio were established 
before the great migration, the migration could not have reversed-caused the instrument. And it is hard to 
think of third variables that could have influenced the occupational distribution of Jews in Russia in the 
1980s and the evolution of wages by occupation in Israel in the 1990s. 
Friedberg’s results are striking. A 12% workforce expansion from immigration gave those already in the 
workforce an 8.9% raise on average over 1989–94 (Friedberg 2001, p. 1395, after scaling from a 
hypothetical 10% inflow to the actual 12% one). With much less statistical precision, she also finds that 
Russian entrants into an occupation increased the number of natives in the occupation, in a 1:2 ratio. These 
patterns fit Ottavani and Peri (2012)’s model of complementarity between foreign- and native-born 
workers. 
Friedberg cites case studies that lend granularity to these patterns: 
Sussman and Zakai [1998] study the labor market for physicians in Israel in the early 1990s. 
They find that Russian physicians—even those with considerable prior experience and 
expertise—were confined to positions as generalists at the lower end of the pay scale in Israeli 
hospitals. This enabled native Israeli physicians to be promoted to fill the higher-paying ranks 
in an expanding health-care system. In addition, because the Russians relieved the overall 
staffing burden at hospitals, native Israelis were able to devote more time to yet higher-paying 
private-practice work. Sussman and Zakai conclude that “relations between the two groups 
were complementary rather than competitive…in providing medical services.” 
In the case of engineers and other highly educated specialists, a government committee 
[Eckstein et al. 1996] gathered evidence on the nature of their employment. Firm managers 
testified that Russian workers were often assigned to more basic tasks or supportive roles, 
freeing Israelis to work on the more productive aspects of projects. As in the case of physicians, 
Russian workers filled positions at the lower end of the job ladder, pushing incumbent Israelis 
up the ranks into more supervisory, high-paying roles. (Friedberg 2001, p. 1396) 
Friedberg (2001) makes a compelling case that the Russian influx into Israel benefitted those already there, 
in part because of the challenges of assimilation, which consigned the immigrants to junior work roles 
despite their depth of education and experience. Her study suggests that industrial economies have the 
flexibility to absorb new workers quickly. 
One important caveat for our review is that the story might have been different for a predominantly low-
skill immigrant cohort. Also, Israel constructed institutions to facilitate assimilation—not least, automatic 
citizenship for Jews—that will be absent in other contexts. 
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5.5 Clemens (2013a), “The Effect of Foreign Labor on Native Employment: A Job-
Specific Approach and Application to North Carolina Farms,” working paper 
Clemens (2013a) is an original paper with compelling econometrics. It appears unique in studying changes 
not in the supply of immigrant workers who might compete for certain jobs, but in the demand among 
natives for those jobs. And it exploits a sharp natural experiment: the Great Recession, which caused the 
number of Americans looking for work to spike. 
Clemens studies whether higher unemployment in North Carolina after 2008 led more people to take farm 
labor jobs that would otherwise have gone to migrant workers with H-2A visas. Under the H-2A program, 
employers wanting to hire temporary immigrants must first advertise the positions in local media, give 
priority to American applicants, and report to the government on these activities, giving justification if any 
American applicants are not hired (Clemens 2013a, p. 11–12). The intent is to ensure that the visas deprive 
no American of a job. Regardless of who fills the positions, they are required to pay at least the minimum 
wage.24  
As Clemens emphasizes, these legal requirements add a second distinctive dimension to the natural 
experiment: in principle, employers must manifest the same economic demand for native and foreign 
workers. In principle, then, any differences in the rate at which the two groups take the work must derive 
from differences in their willingness to do so rather than in their value to employers—that is, from the 
supply side of the labor market, not the demand side. If natives avoid the work, “this might be because 
natives dislike manual or routine work itself, because they dislike circumstances of the work (dirt, stench, 
exposure to the elements), or because they incur a social stigma for performing such work.” This is 
scientifically interesting because conventional studies—including all above—cannot distinguish supply- 
from demand-side factors. 
Clemens’s result can be stripped down to a few stark numbers. After the unemployed population in the 
North Carolina counties studied surged from 283,000 in 2008 to 490,000 in 2009, the number of natives 
who sought such agricultural work (in the sense of getting a referral from an unemployment agency) fell, 
from 170 to 108. The number who actually started the work dropped from 58 to 48. And the number who 
stuck it out for the season fell from 11 to 6. (Clemens 2013a, Table 2.) In sum, more than 200,000 people 
lost their jobs and essentially none went to work picking produce. This is convincing evidence that at 
today’s margins, Americans and migrants are not competing for these jobs. An expansion of migrant farm 
worker programs would therefore cost essentially no American jobs. 
Like the other natural experiment–based studies, this one gains internal validity (convincing econometrics) 
at the expense of external validity (generalizability). Admitting more Jamaicans temporarily to work fields 
in North Carolina is a different thing from admitting new, low-skill immigrants as permanent residents and 
citizens. The two may affect labor markets differently. In this case, in thinking about generalizability, I think 
it helps to understand better the economic disconnect between temporary migrant farm workers and their 
erstwhile American competitors. 
Barriers to immigration between rich and poor countries are like dikes. Even if they leak a bit they sustain 
differences between the water levels—wages—on each side. As noted at the outset of this review, Clemens, 
Montenegro, and Pritchett (2008) have documented just how well the dikes work: “observably identical” 
people earn 2.0–15.5 as much on the rich side as on the poor. The thrust of US migrant farm worker 
 
24 20 CFR 655.120, law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/20/655.120. 
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programs is to admit foreigners onto rich-country soil while keeping them on the other side of the dike 
legally, politically and economically. Jamaican workers may come to America but the employers come to 
the Jamaican labor market. If American law requires employers to treat Jamaicans like Americans, to pay 
Jamaicans more than would be needed to attract them to the jobs, then we should expect employers to 
tacitly claw back some of those “rents” (i.e., the windfall to Jamaicans from being paid like Americans). As 
profit maximizers, agricultural firms will likely aim to reduce the effective cost of the immigrants and seek 
to hire just them. They might find ways to pay the immigrants less, such as by paying for piecework that 
must be done at unrealistic rates to match minimum wage. And they might cut corners on housing, food, 
and worker safety (such as protection from pesticides) while leveraging their market power to punish 
those who complain about conditions. They might buy support in Congress and capture the bureaucracy 
that regulates them. They might try to shed native workers, who may stir up trouble. All these things have 
been documented to some degree (Yeoman 2001, Guerra 2004, Farmworker Justice 2011, Jornaleros Safe 
2013). The deep force at work is that the immigrants, as foreigners, have less recourse than native citizens 
and so in equilibrium such leveraging of power takes place more than if the workers were native. 
If right, this insight has interesting implications for the generalizability of the Clemens (2013a) finding. On 
the one hand, it explains why a non-marginal change—abolition of migrant farm workers—would benefit 
native low-skill workers in the first instance. To entice them, farm managers would have to offer better 
wages and/or working conditions. (Though the workers might be hurt indirectly by higher food prices and 
lower local spending by skilled employees in the weakened local agriculture industry.) This scenario, 
though, is academic, since it is not a serious political possibility. What is more realistic is expansion of 
migrant farm labor, to which the Clemens (2013a) finding generalizes. 
Meanwhile, the finding of low native-immigrant competition at the current margin may generalize in spirit 
to a huge class of people: undocumented migrants, including a lot of those kitchen workers. They too lack 
the economic and legal recourse of natives, which weakens their bargaining power in the labor market. 
Perhaps this helps explain some of their apparent complementary with natives. Perhaps if they gained legal 
status en masse they would compete more directly with all legal workers, diffusing their competitive wage 
effects more widely. 
5.6 Summary: studies of wage and employment impacts exploiting natural 
experiments 
Unsurprisingly, the studies based on natural experiments produce some of the most compelling evidence in 
this review. Particularly strong are Card (1990) on the Mariel Boatlift, Friedberg (2001) on Russian Jews 
entering Israel, and Clemens (2013a) on migrant farm workers in North Carolina. Subject to important 
caveats about generalizability—e.g., can all cities absorb Cubans as fast as Miami or Israel?—they provide 
strong evidence of zero or positive side effects for natives. 
6 Studies of impacts on innovation and productivity 
The studies reviewed so far have mainly looked at impacts on earnings and employment. A distinct but 
related economic variable potentially affected by immigration is productivity, which is ultimately driven by 
innovation. The observation that motivates an interest in these variables is that skilled foreign workers are 
extremely important in technology industries, which is why big software companies lobby for more 
openness to immigration. The prominence of immigrants in the skilled workforces of innovative companies 
suggests that immigration can affect the pace of innovation, with long-term implications for all workers. 
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The study of productivity effects is also an important complement, as it were, to skill studies, which, recall, 
can only assess relative, not absolute, effects on wages. If we believe that immigration raises productivity 
and thus wages for large swaths of workers, then a skill-cell finding that some groups’ wages fall relative to 
others’ might only mean that wages rise more slowly for some than others. 
6.1 Kerr and Lincoln (2010), “The Supply Side of Innovation: H-1B Visa Reforms 
and US Ethnic Invention,” Journal of Labor Economics 
The reviews above of the two Peri, Shih, and Sparber studies describe the US H-1B visa program, which 
licenses employers to import skilled labor. Kerr and Lincoln (2010) also study the impact of the H-1B 
program using spatial methods, but their primary interest is not in wages and employment, but in 
patenting as an indicator of innovation. 
Since patent records do not reveal the immigration status of the filers, Kerr and Lincoln track whether the 
number of filings from a given metropolitan area by people with Indian or Chinese names varied in tandem 
with the estimated local stock of H-1B workers of the same nationality. About 40% of H-1B recipients 
during 2000–05 came from India, and another 10% from China. 
Despite the standard concerns about spatial studies, the pattern of results once again helps convince, by 
tending to rule out alternative theories. During 1995–2007, among cities in the top quintile of dependence 
on H-1B workers, a 10% increase in the national H-1B population corresponded with a 6–12% increase in 
patent filing by people with Indian or Chinese names and a 0–2% rise in filings overall (Kerr and Lincoln 
2010, p. 498). The effects are smaller for lower-H-1B-dependence quintiles, and for nationalities less 
prominent in the H-1B visa program (Kerr and Lincoln 2010, Table 4, col 3 and rows 2& 3). This is what 
one would expect if immigration is indeed causing more patenting. There was no effect on patenting by 
people with Anglo-Saxon names—again as one would expect, since the population of such people would 
hardly have grown from H-1Bs (Kerr and Lincoln 2010, Table 4, col 4). And in an “placebo” test, variation in 
H-1B workers in the US had no effect on US patent filing rates by people in Canadian cities (Kerr and 
Lincoln 2010, Table 4, panel E). That might seem like a strange test, but to the extent that the US and 
Canadian technology industries evolve similarly, it helps rule out the possibility that something about the 
American technology industry was driving both higher patenting and more recruitment of foreign workers, 
without causation running from immigration to invention. For if it had, Canadian patenting would probably 
have risen too. 
Overall, the study supports the view that immigrants contribute to American innovation. It finds little sign 
that they displace natives as inventors. 
6.2 Peri (2012), “The Effect of Immigration on Productivity: Evidence from U.S. 
States,” Review of Economics and Statistics 
This paper shares features with Peri and Sparber (2009) and Peri, Shih, and Sparber (2014a), reviewed 
above, while studying impacts on productivity rather than job specialization or wages. It is spatial, with the 
unit of geography being the state; its instruments are similar, being based on both past immigration 
patterns and proximity to immigration ports of entry; it includes robustness tests that attempt to address 
challenges to the instruments; and yet, as in Peri and Sparber (2009), the instruments do worse on 
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econometric tests of validity than the paper contends.25 Unfortunately the paper’s conclusions are weaker 
than those in Peri and Sparber (2009) because the statistical findings are consistent with plausible 
competing theories. The positive correlation discovered between immigration and state-level productivity 
growth can easily be explained by higher productivity growth leading to higher economic growth, leading 
in turn to more work opportunities for migrants. The failure of the instruments on statistical validity tests 
leaves the door open to this explanation. 
6.3 Borjas and Doran (2012), “The Collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
Productivity of American Mathematicians,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
The collapse of the Soviet Union made several demographic waves—not just the flow of Jews to Israel. 
Among the tiniest was the emigration of some 336 Soviet mathematicians to the United States, where many 
took up residence at elite universities in the early 1990s ((Borjas and Doran 2012, p. 1161). 
After voluminous data collection and painstaking analysis, Borjas and Doran (2012) show convincingly that 
the intensified competition from immigrants reduced job opportunities for American mathematicians, 
forcing some into other professions. Productivity of American mathematicians, measured by papers 
published, also fell. The study thus supports the Ottaviano and Peri (2012) finding that natives and 
immigrants compete more directly at the high end of the skill spectrum, while, ironically, tending to 
contradict the Friedberg (2001) study of Russian Jewish immigration to Israel. 
However, the study seems among the least generalizable in this review. The elite university operates on a 
peculiar business model. To recruit top professors, the universities offer a rent: substantial time to perform 
research as the professors choose, which does not really create capturable economic value for the 
education industry, but strengthens the university in the zero-sum competition for students and funding. 
The amount of this rent available nationally grows only slowly, so it makes sense that the arrival of great 
mathematicians from the Soviet Union displaced less-talented Americans. But the rest of the private sector 
probably has more capacity to absorb talent in ways that create fresh economic value, which employers can 
partly capture. Outside of the academy, this should generally make hiring additional talent a positive-sum 
game and remove the sort of ceiling found for academic mathematicians. 
6.4 Moser, Voena, and Waldinger (2014), “German Jewish Émigrés and U.S. 
Invention,” American Economic Review 
This new study arrives in counterpoint to Borjas and Doran (2012). Moser, Voena, and Waldinger (2013) 
estimate the impacts on American innovation of the migration of Jewish chemists from Nazi Germany to the 
United States.26 Why chemistry? Through to the early 20th century, Germany led the discipline, so many of 
those who fled were among its giants. After moving, the émigrés revolutionized American chemistry 
(Moser, Voena, and Waldinger 2013, p. 3222). Meanwhile, innovation in chemistry is easier to patent than 
in, say, math and physics, so it leaves clearer footprints for economists to follow, in the form of patent 
filings. 
Moser, Voena, and Waldinger make comparisons across subfields of chemistry, according to a 166-entry 
 
25 The comments in footnote 21 apply here. As an example, in my runs, the total factor productivity regressions (Peri 
2012, Table 2, row 4) return Hansen overidentification test p values of 0.01, 0.11, 0.15, 0.27, and 0.15, with smaller 
values appearing alongside larger estimates of the impact on productivity. 
26 The study also covers chemists from Austria, which Germany annexed in 1938. 
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typology, asking whether those receiving any of the 26 émigrés to the US saw more patenting by American 
nationals. 
One endogenous-causation story to worry about is that US patent activity followed German innovation for 
reasons aside from immigration. Perhaps a decade or so after Germans made breakthroughs in basic 
science, Americans turned those insights into patentable inventions. We might then expect patenting in the 
subfields receiving German émigrés to take off simply because those also tended to be the subfields with 
recently active German researchers, émigré or otherwise. To guard against this possibility, Moser, Voena, 
and Waldinger restrict their sample to subfields with active German researchers—émigré or otherwise—
where “active” is defined by filing for US patents. (Even then, foreign nationals could and did file for US 
patents.) Within this subset, they perform differences-in-differences, examining whether patenting by 
Americans rose more in subfields not only having active German researchers, but receiving German 
émigrés, as compared to fields with active German researchers but no émigrés. 
To further reduce endogeneity, the authors borrow a trick from the Friedberg (2001) study of Russian Jews 
in Israel. Since émigrés might have switched fields after arrival in the US to work in areas where Americans 
were more innovative anyway—another endogeneity story to rule out—Moser, Voena, and Waldinger 
create an instrument that assigns émigrés to their pre-arrival subfields. In effect, they search for a 
patenting bump-up among Americans in subfields in which German Jews were active before the migrated, 
in comparison with subfields in which only non-migrating Germans worked. 
This design makes for persuasive conclusions. A representative result: Chemistry subfields with émigrés 
recorded an extra 170 patents/year during 1933–70, equivalent to an increase of about 70% over pre-1933 
levels (Moser, Voena, and Waldinger 2013, p. 3239). 
Digging deeper, the authors find that 75% of the relative increase was associated not with established US 
inventors, but with ones who had not patented before 1933 and were probably younger and newer to 
chemistry (Moser, Voena, and Waldinger 2013, p. 3247). Cutting the data another way, the increase 
occurred more among US scientists who were co-inventors of the émigrés, meaning ones whose names 
appeared alongside an émigré’s in at least one filing—and among co-inventors of co-inventors. These 
findings combine to suggest that émigrés shaped American chemistry through network effects, especially 
by attracting students to their subfields. In this way, immigrants complemented natives even as they must 
have competed with them too. 
The positive side effects of German immigrants for native chemists contrasts with the Borjas and Doran 
(2012) results on Soviets in mathematics. What to make of the contrast? Both studies are credible, so the 
relevant question is not which is right, but which is more representative of the rest of the economy. 
Notably, while patents are only a rough proxy for the economic value of innovation—many great ideas, 
such as the World Wide Web, are not patented while many insignificant inventions ones are—patent 
counts are probably more meaningful than paper publication counts, the key productivity indicator in 
Borjas and Doran (2012). Patents are closer to the economic process of innovation and the capacity of the 
US Patent Office to absorb innovations is not capped like journal space. Since the capacity of an industrial 
economy to exploit innovation is also not limited by quota, the impact of immigration on patent filings in 
chemistry looks to be more representative of the typical impacts of skilled immigration on productivity. 
On the other hand, the typical migrant is not a titan of research, like some among those 26 émigrés. So we 
should not rush to cite this study as proof that skilled immigration speeds innovation among natives 
generally. 
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6.5 Summary: studies of impacts on innovation and productivity 
This mini-review of research on how immigration affects innovation and productivity is motivated by two 
sorts of implications. First the research speaks to whether immigration of skilled professionals likely helps 
the majority of the receiving population in the long term by accelerating innovation, in a way that is hard to 
pick up in direct analysis of impacts on wages and employment. Second, the research can provide more 
examples of immigrants affecting labor markets, which is especially interesting to the extent that we can 
generalize from the cases studied to the low-skill workers we care most about because of their 
vulnerability. 
It bears emphasizing that under neither motivation should we shed many tears for any skilled natives who 
lose jobs or pay from immigration. Perhaps some of those displaced mathematicians ended up working on 
Wall Street. As Clemens (2011), p. 95, points out, the side effects of immigration, positive and negative, 
arise out of the operation of markets. This, economists normally do not regret because it increases 
efficiency. The main economic caveat comes if efficiency exacts a cost among people who are poor. 
With regard to the first motive, only one of the studies reviewed in this section attempts to link 
immigration directly to productivity (Peri 2012), and it is open to substantial challenges. So there is little 
strong evidence that immigration broadly raises economic productivity and thereby helps most workers in 
a way not picked up in research that looks more directly at wages. The three studies of impacts on 
innovation, proxied by journal papers and patent filings, are more convincing. Whether those patent filings 
translate into higher productivity broadly shared again seems conjectural. 
As for the second motive, the study showing negative side effects (Borjas and Doran 2012) seems least 
generalizable, especially to markets for low-skill labor. And Kerr and Lincoln (2010) and Moser, Voena, and 
Waldinger (2013) find neutral-to-positive impacts on natives. 
7 Conclusion 
Table 2 summarizes this review. 
The evidence base does not support us with certainties, only best bets. In this case, a variety of studies 
deploying different methods in different contexts, and some general knowledge about how economies 
work, coalesce into a fairly consistent picture. Industrial economies can generally absorb migrants fairly 
quickly, in part because capital is flexible, in part because immigrants are consumers as well as producers. 
Thus, long-term average impacts are probably zero at worst. And the long-term may come quickly, 
especially if migration inflows are predictable to investors. Possibly, skilled immigration boosts 
productivity and wages for many others, but at this point that is mostly a matter of conjecture. 
Around the averages, there are distributional effects. The labor market does appear somewhat segmented, 
not just by skill level, as measured by education and experience, but also by nativity, which itself may proxy 
for possession of skills such as fluency in the receiving country’s language. Thus the competitive side effects 
of immigration to a degree concentrated within certain labor market segments. Among low-income 
workers, the ones who stand to lose the most are those who most closely resemble new arrivals, in being 
immigrants themselves, being low-skill, being less assimilated, and perhaps in being undocumented. Thus 
the common statement that natives have little to fear does not represent the whole story. 
By the same token, native workers and earlier immigrants tend to benefit from the arrival of workers 
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different from them, who complement more than compete with them in production. An important 
consequence is that skilled immigration can offset the effects of low-skill immigration on natives and 
earlier immigrants. 
The third and fourth columns of Table 1, based on Ottaviano and Peri (2012), display some representative 
estimates of the impacts of the large and relatively skill-balanced US immigration inflow of 1990–2006. A 
roughly 100% increase in the immigrant stock is estimated to have raised wages slightly for natives while 
reducing them about 10% among less-educated earlier immigrants. Arguably these losses are modest 
compared with the earnings gains the earlier immigrants themselves achieved by coming to the US. 
Looking ahead, a proportionally larger or less skill-balanced immigration inflow could have larger impacts. 
A more legal inflow, on the other hand, might reduce the economic ghettoization of immigrant low-skill 
workers and diffuse their competitive impacts more evenly. 
TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF STUDY REVIEWS 
Study 
Unit of 
observation 
Source of variation 
for cited findings Findings Comments 
Spatial studies that do not exploit natural experiments 
Card (2001) 
US city × broad 
skill/occupation 
group, 1990 
Estimates of 1985–90 
immigration to city-
occupation groups, 
based on total US 
immigration by 
sending country, their 
national-level 
dispersion across 
education groups, and 
1985 immigrant stock 
by city and sending 
country. 
10% labor supply increase 
cuts employment rate 2.02 
points (male natives), 0.81 
points (female natives), 
0.96 points (male earlier 
immigrants), 1.46 points 
(female earlier 
immigrants); cuts wages 
0.99 points (male natives), 
2.5 points (female earlier 
immigrants), 
indistinguishable from 0 
(other groups). 
Blunts criticisms of spatial 
studies by focusing on 
short run and showing that 
immigration not followed 
by departure of natives 
from a city. Looking across 
cities and skill-levels at 
once allows removal of 
bias from omitted third 
variables with impacts that 
are constant across either 
dimension, such as some 
cities having more 
dynamic economies. But 
impacts on earlier 
immigrants only indirectly 
inferred, from employment 
and wage changes in 
occupation groups they 
tend to enter. 
Cortes 
(2008) 
US city × census 
round, 1980–2000  
Estimated low-skill 
immigrant stock by 
city, year based on 
national-level stocks by 
sending country and 
1970 stocks by city and 
sending country. 
10% increase in the 
immigrant share in low-
skill workforce cuts prices 
of low-skill–intensive 
services 2% and low-skill 
wages ~1–1.5%. 
Weak-to-no impact on 
high-skill–intensive 
services and tradable 
goods corroborates 
interpretation of 
correlation as causation 
since full pattern hard to 
explain otherwise. 
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Study 
Unit of 
observation 
Source of variation 
for cited findings Findings Comments 
Peri, Shih, 
and Sparber 
(2014a) 
US city × period 
(periods: 1990–
2000, 2000–05, 
2005–10) 
Estimated H-1B–driven 
rise in STEM 
workforce, based on 
1990 foreign STEM 
workforce by city and 
sending country and 
national-level 
distribution of H-1B 
visas by sending 
country 
A 1 percentage point 
increase in foreign share 
in STEM workers raises 
native STEM wages 7–8% 
Impacts implausibly large: 
can explain 30–50% of US 
productivity growth in 
1990–2010. Suggests 
endogeneity. 
Peri, Shih, 
and Sparber 
(2014b) 
US cities, 2009–11 
Numbers of H-1B visa 
denials for computer-
related professions, 
which depend on 
numbers of 
applications and 
lottery 
177,386 visa denials in 
2007–08 cost 231,000 
native computer-related 
jobs 
Reliance on lottery as 
random determinant 
unpersuasive because it 
likely mattered less for 
number of visa denials 
than did (non-random) 
number of applications. 
Skill cell studies that do not exploit natural experiments 
Borjas 
(2003) 
Education level × 
experience level × 
US census survey, 
1960–2000 
Number of foreign-
born workers in each 
education-experience-
year group 
~10% migration-induced 
labor growth in 1980–
2000 cut wages for native 
non-high-school-
completers 8.9% 
Assumes the capital stock 
did not adjust to labor 
expansion and that native- 
and foreign-born are 
perfect substitutes so that 
natives face as much 
competition from new 
arrivals as do earlier 
immigrants. 
Borjas 
(2014), ch. 5 
Education level × 
experience level × 
US census survey, 
1960–2010 
Number of foreign-
born workers in each 
education-experience-
year group 
10.6% migration-induced 
labor growth in 1990–
2010 cut wages for native 
non-high-school-
completers 6.2% (no 
capital adjustment) or 
3.1% (after full capital 
adjustment) 
Argues that native- and 
foreign-born are best seen 
as perfect substitutes, as 
above. 
Ottaviano 
and Peri 
(2012) 
Education level × 
experience level × 
native/immigrant × 
US census survey, 
1960–2006 
Total person-weeks of 
work in each 
education-experience-
nativity-year group 
10.0% migration-induced 
labor growth in 1990–
2006 raised wages for 
native non-high-school-
completers 1.7%, cut them 
for foreign-born 8.1% 
(both after full capital 
adjustment) 
Finding of imperfect 
native-immigrant 
substitutability differences 
more fragile than Borjas 
findings on substitutability 
across skill groups, as 
shown in Borjas, Gorgger, 
and Hanson 2012. 
Manacorda, 
Manning, 
and 
Wadsworth 
(2012) 
Education level × 
experience level × 
native/immigrant × 
UK survey year, 
~1975–2005 
(quinquennial) 
Number of people in 
each education-
experience-nativity-
year group 
Migration-induced labor 
growth in 1975–2005 
reduced wages for 
immigrant university 
graduates 0.8%/year 
compounding; no effect on 
others 
 
Studies of wage and employment impacts exploiting natural experiments 
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Study 
Unit of 
observation 
Source of variation 
for cited findings Findings Comments 
Card (1990) 
Miami + 4 other US 
cities, early ‘80s 
Occurrence of Mariel 
Boatlift from Cuba in 
April–October 1980, 
which expanded 
Miami’s workforce 7% 
but the other cities’ 
hardly at all 
No change in following few 
years in wages or 
unemployment in Miami 
relative to comparator 
cities—notably among 
blacks, a 
disproportionately low-
skill group 
Natural experiment not as 
perfect as randomized 
since other events could 
have offset Boatlift’s 
effects. But zero change 
after 7% labor supply 
spike most easily 
explained as (non-)impact. 
Hunt (1992) 
Provinces of France, 
1967/68 
When Algeria won 
independence in 1962, 
900,000 ethnic French, 
relatively skilled on 
average, repatriated, 
settling in some 
provinces more than 
others 
Nationally, 1.6% labor 
supply growth increased 
unemployment by up to 
0.2 percentage points, cut 
wages 0.51–0.80% 
Experiment may not have 
been clean since 
repatriates settled more in 
the south of France, whose 
economic trajectory 
differed in the 1960s. 
Carrington 
and de Lima 
(1996) 
Portugal vs. Spain, 
1970s; districts of 
Portugal, 1970s 
Repatriation of ethnic 
Portuguese from 
Angola and 
Mozambique, relatively 
skilled on average, in 
1974–76 
Sudden 10% labor 
expansion may have sped 
Portuguese 
unemployment rise during 
European downturn and 
depressed construction 
wages 
Experiment may not have 
been clean because of 
simultaneous major events 
in the country: 
revolutionary end of a 
dictatorship, 
nationalization of 
industries, labor law 
changes. 
Friedberg 
(2001) 
Large sample of 
Israeli workers, 
divided into some 
100 occupation 
groups, 1989 & 
1994 
Flow of Soviet Jewish 
immigrants to Israel in 
1989–95, by pre-
departure occupation 
Sudden 12% labor 
expansion increased 
earnings 8.9% for those 
already in workforce over 
1989–94 
Persuasive. Hard to 
otherwise explain 
correlation between 
number of immigrants by 
pre-departure occupation 
and later Israeli wage 
growth in same. Backed by 
case studies. Suggests 
complementarity between 
new immigrants and rest, 
at least among skilled 
workers. But Israeli efforts 
to absorb migrants, 
including instant 
citizenship, perhaps rare. 
Clemens 
(2013a) 
58 employment 
offices × 66 months, 
North Carolina, Feb 
2005–May 2011 
Great Recession–
caused unemployment 
jump 2008–09 
After total unemployed in 
studied counties rose from 
283,000 to 490,000, 
number of natives who 
took and held farm jobs 
normally filled by 
migrants went from 11 to 
6. 
Persuasive. Under current 
pay and working 
conditions, natives avoid 
farm labor. Migrant farm 
labor market separate 
from native job market. 
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Study 
Unit of 
observation 
Source of variation 
for cited findings Findings Comments 
Studies of impacts on innovation and productivity 
Kerr and 
Lincoln 
(2010) 
US cities × year, 
1995–2007 
Estimated number of 
H-1B holders in a city, 
by ethnicity, based on 
national-level H-1B 
ethnic breakdown and 
number of H-1B 
applications in 2001–
02 
Among top quintile of 
cities in H-1B dependence, 
10% increase in national 
H-1B population 
associated in same year 
with 6–12% increase in 
patent filing by people 
with Indian or Chinese 
names and 0–2% rise 
overall 
Persuasive. Chinese and 
Indian largest ethnicities 
among H-1B holders. 
Small-to-no effect found 
for less-common H-1B 
ethnicities, for filers with 
Anglo-Saxon names, for 
less H-1B–dependent 
cities, and for Canadian 
cities (placebo) test. 
Pattern most easily 
explained as impact. No 
sign of displacement of 
native inventors. 
Peri (2012) 
US states × US 
census survey, 
1960–2006 
Distance to Mexican 
border; estimates of 
migrant stocks based 
on 1960 stocks by state 
and sending country, 
and national-level 
growth rates by 
sending country since. 
Immigration increases 
productivity (output per 
units of labor and capital 
input) 
Study performs aggressive 
robustness tests. However, 
contrary to study text, 
instruments fail an 
exogeneity test and results 
can be explained by non-
exogenous theory such as 
reverse causation. 
Borjas and 
Doran 
(2012) 
US & Soviet 
mathematicians 
who published in 
1970–89 
Arrival of ~336 Soviet 
mathematicians in US 
just after collapse of 
USSR 
American mathematicians 
in subfields with active 
émigrés were published 
and cited less after 1992 
and more likely to leave 
profession, indicating 
zero-sum displacement by 
new immigrants. 
Persuasive. But does not 
seem a good model for 
most of the economy. 
Academic postings and 
journal space grow slowly, 
so that new talent, if 
superior, must displace 
old. Scope for innovation in 
most of the economy is 
more elastic. 
Moser, 
Voena, and 
Waldinger 
(2013) 
166 chemistry 
subfields × year, US, 
1920–70 
Starting in 1933, 
arrival of 26 Jewish 
émigré chemists from 
Nazi Germany & 
Austria, distinguishing 
their pre-departure 
subfields from ones 
with active 
German/Austrian 
researchers who didn’t 
leave 
American inventors in 
subfields with émigrés 
recorded an extra 170 
patents/year in 1933–70 
in total, 70% over pre-
1933 level 
Persuasive. As in Friedberg 
(2001), correlation with 
émigré’s pre-departure 
field reduces plausibility of 
competing theories. 
Backed by historians’ 
observations of the impact 
of the émigrés on 
chemistry in US. 
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Appendix 
Here I discuss the criticisms of Ottaviano and Peri (2012) (OP) in Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson (2012) 
(BGH). 
Errors in data set construction 
In replicating the construction of the OP data set, BGH find errors, such as failing to exclude self-employed 
workers when computing average wages, which is not what OP intended. In my experience, replication 
always turns up such errors.1 BGH show these fixes to increase the apparent substitutability between 
immigrants and natives. In the empirics cited below, I use Borjas (2014) data, which should incorporate 
these corrections. 
The fragility of estimates of the substitutability of high school graduates and high 
school non-completers 
BGH argue that just as the relationship of labor and capital resists estimation in national data, so does the 
substitutability between workers with and without a high school degree. But BGH do not tie this point 
directly to the OP analysis and results. Rather, they take it to “illustrate the limits of what the nested CES 
framework [introduced by Borjas (2003)] can teach us about the labor market impact of immigration.” The 
argument thus does not seem to speak to the relative credibility of OP and the Borjas analyses but to the 
value of the whole skill cell approach. Also, as argued below, the ordering of the CES hierarchy is not sacred. 
The split in question can be pushed lower, providing a larger sample for estimation. 
Log mean wages versus mean log wages 
In aggregating census data for individual workers to the level of the skill cell, OP take the log of the ratio of 
the averages of immigrant and native wages, which is the difference of the log means. BGH contend that it is 
the mean log that is theoretically valid and standard practice. And it happens to matter: in BGH’s 
replication, making the switch destroys OP’s finding that natives and immigrants are somewhat 
complementary. 
Using mean logs does seem to be standard practice, although one precedent BGH cite, Katz and Murphy 
(1992), Table 1, appears to take log means. Yet at least in the context at hand, theory seems to side with OP. 
This does not vitiate the concern about fragility in the OP regressions—results should be robust to this sort 
of mathematical niggling. But it does mean that the criticism is a bit overdrawn. The BGH versions of the OP 
regressions are not obviously superior. 
The theoretical question is: what production function best describes how individual workers contribute to 
total productivity-adjusted labor supply in a skill cell? The most natural assumption is that workers within 
a cell are perfectly substitutable, so that their total labor is a linear combination of their individual 
contributions. As a simple example to get at functional form, suppose the economy is Cobb-Douglas with 
 
1 Indeed, in working with the Borjas 2014 code for his Table 5.3, I found an error in the regressions estimating native-
immigrant substitutability for male and female workers together: they use male-only wage variables for immigrants. 
Fixing the error does not change interpretations. 
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inputs capital, 𝐾, and perfectly substitutable workers, 𝐿𝑖: 
𝑄 = 𝐿𝛼𝐾1−𝛼 = (∑ 𝜃𝑖𝐿𝑖
𝑖
)
𝛼
𝐾1−𝛼 
The wage of worker 𝑖 is taken to be her marginal product, which is 
𝑤𝑖 =
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝐿𝑖
 
So the mean wage, weighted by hours worked, is 
?̅? =
∑ 𝐿𝑖𝑤𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝐿𝑖𝑖
 
How are we to meaningfully define a marginal increase in aggregate labor 𝐿 in order to speak of the 
marginal product of aggregate labor? The best way seems to be to equate a marginal increase in 𝐿 to 
simultaneous marginal increases in each 𝐿𝑖 in proportion to each worker’s share in total hours, i.e., in 
proportion to 𝐿𝑖. So the marginal product of aggregate labor would be defined: 
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝐿
≡
∑ 𝐿𝑖
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝐿𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝐿𝑖𝑖
=
∑ 𝐿𝑖𝑤𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝐿𝑖𝑖
= ?̅? 
and 
log
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝐿
= log ?̅? 
Thus the log mean used by OP is a theoretically grounded proxy for the log marginal product of labor. 
“Correct” weights? 
BGH argue that if we grant OP their log means, OP still use the wrong observation weights. The usual 
rationale for weighting in this literature is to increase efficiency (precision) by down-weighting 
observations that are less precise, coming from smaller underlying samples. 
Since the OP dependent variables are logs of ratios of mean wages, BGH write down the formula for the 
variance of such variables, whose inverse is the “correct” weight. The BGH weights are sensible; but calling 
them “correct” again overreaches. This is because in the heteroskedastic regression 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽𝑥𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 with 
Var[𝜖𝑖] = 𝜎𝑖
2, the efficient weight is not Var[𝑦𝑖], which BGH compute, but Var[𝑦𝑖|𝑥] = Var[𝜖𝑖] = 𝜎𝑖
2, which is 
unknown. Since we are ignorant of the efficient weights, we cannot be certain that the BGH weights are 
closer to them than the OP ones. 
Saturation with dummies 
BGH point out that the addition of a large number of fixed effect dummies destroys the OP estimates of 
native-immigrant substitutability. But in doing so BGH hold OP to a higher standard than Borjas (2003, 
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2014) holds himself. They also unmoor the regressions from their motivating theory, compromising 
interpretation. 
Borjas (2003, section VII.A), introduces a nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) model with three 
levels: 
𝑄𝑡 = [𝜆𝐾𝑡𝐾𝑡
𝜈 + 𝜆𝐿𝑡𝐿𝑡
𝜈]1 𝜈⁄  
𝐿𝑡 = (∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑡𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝜌
𝑖
)
1 𝜌⁄
 
𝐿𝑖𝑡 = (∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝜂
𝑗
)
1 𝜂⁄
 
where 𝑡, 𝑖, 𝑗 index time, education level, and experience level and in practice 𝜈 = 0. Equating the cell-level 
wage 𝑗 to the marginal product of cell-level labor, we obtain 
log 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 = log
𝜕𝑄𝑡
𝜕𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡
 
= log 𝜆𝐿𝑡 +
1
𝜎𝐾𝐿
log 𝑄𝑡 + (
1
𝜎𝐸
−
1
𝜎𝐾𝐿
) log 𝐿𝑡 + log 𝜃𝑖𝑡 + (
1
𝜎𝑋
−
1
𝜎𝐸
) log 𝐿𝑖𝑡 + log 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡 −
1
𝜎𝑋
log 𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 
(1) 
where 𝜎𝐾𝐿 ≡ 1/(1 − 𝜈), 𝜎𝐸 ≡ 1/(1 − 𝜌), 𝜎𝑋 ≡ 1/(1 − 𝜂)are the elasticities of substitution. Since there is a 
distinct and unknown 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡  for every observation, they and the other parameters cannot all be identified. To 
achieve identification, Borjas (2003), p. 1361, assumes the 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡  are time-invariant, fitting: 
log 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑗 −
1
𝜎𝑋
log 𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 (2) 
where the 𝛿𝑖𝑡  capture the first five terms of (1) and the 𝛿𝑖𝑗  model the log 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡 . The fingerprint of the nested 
CES model in this empirical specification is the asymmetry in the choice of dummies. Out of conservatism, 
dummies 𝛿𝑗𝑡  could be added to more fully model the 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡  (or model omitted variables): 
log 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿𝑗𝑡 −
1
𝜎𝑋
log 𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 (3) 
But this symmetrically dummy-saturated specification would effectively bring the empirical strategy back 
to the earlier, atheoretic part of Borjas (2003, eq. 3). 
To appreciate this point, consider that Borjas (2003) could have swapped education and experience in his 
hierarchy. Subdividing labor first by experience then by education is certainly nonstandard, but all of these 
models are crude approximations, so none should be especially privileged. And OP find that doing this (in 
their “Model D”) leads to very similar empirical results. By analogy with (2), the estimating equation for the 
bottom-level elasticity would then have been 
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log 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑗 −
1
𝜎𝐸
log 𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 . 
If Borjas or BGH had then saturated this equation with dummies, it would have again brought us to (3)—
but would now we would interpret the coefficient on log 𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 as −1/𝜎𝐸  rather than −1/𝜎𝑋. Thus, saturating 
hierarchical CES estimating equations with dummies eliminates their theoretical meaning. 
Arguably, the root of the trouble is that the hierarchical CES model is too general to be fit to the data, 
because labor’s productivity, 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡 , may vary as much as its supply, 𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡. The competition between the 
unobserved 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡  and the observed 𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 to explain 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 forces an additional assumption, about how much 
variation to allow for 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡 . And that opens the door to dispute. Options that conservatively allow more 
variation in 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡, such as including 𝛿𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿𝑗𝑡 instead of just 𝛿𝑖𝑗 , remove parallel identifying variation in 𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡. 
There is a bias-efficiency tradeoff. 
Now, to the Borjas hierarchical model, OP add a fourth level, splitting natives from immigrants. Imitating 
Borjas (2003), the unidentified equation for the elasticity at this new bottom level, 𝜎𝑁, would have the 
form: 
log 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑡 + log 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 −
1
𝜎𝑁
log 𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 (4) 
where 𝑘 = 𝐹 or 𝐷 for foreign or domestic. This would be estimated on a data set with observations by 
education, experience, immigration status, and census year. If OP had copied Borjas in assuming that the 
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 are time-invariant, they would have fit 
log 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑘 −
1
𝜎𝑁
log 𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 (5) 
However OP estimate differently. They subtract the log 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝐷𝑡 equation from the log 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝐹𝑡 one, both given by 
(4), to get 
log
𝑤𝑖𝑗𝐹𝑡
𝑤𝑖𝑗𝐷𝑡
=
log 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝐹𝑡
log 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝐷𝑡
−
1
𝜎𝑁
log
𝐿𝑖𝑗𝐹𝑡
𝐿𝑖𝑗𝐷𝑡
 
for which, in the Borjas (2003) mold, the estimating equation would be 
log
𝑤𝑖𝑗𝐹𝑡
𝑤𝑖𝑗𝐷𝑡
= 𝛿𝑖𝑗 −
1
𝜎𝑁
log
𝐿𝑖𝑗𝐹𝑡
𝐿𝑖𝑗𝐷𝑡
 (6) 
The 𝛿 dummies here lack an immigration status subscript 𝑘 because log 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝐹𝑡 log 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝐷𝑡⁄  does not depend on 
𝑘. They lack a 𝑡 subscript in analogy with Borjas (2003). As a result, estimating with this equation would be 
exactly as conservative in controlling for fixed effects as in Borjas (2003, 2014). In fact, it produces the 
same point estimates as (5). 
But OP are more conservative because they add time dummies: 
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log
𝑤𝑖𝑗𝐹𝑡
𝑤𝑖𝑗𝐷𝑡
= 𝛿𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 −
1
𝜎𝑁
log
𝐿𝑖𝑗𝐹𝑡
𝐿𝑖𝑗𝐷𝑡
 
This allows log 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝐹𝑡 log 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝐷𝑡⁄ , the log ratio of the productivities for immigrant and native labor, to have 
two additive components, one varying over skill cells, one over time. This equation is used for columns 2, 3, 
5, 6 of OP Table 2 and columns 3 and 7 of BGH Table 1. 
Even though OP are more conservative than Borjas, BGH argue that OP are not conservative enough. More 
fixed-effect dummies are needed to rule out competing causal stories. Their robustness testing (columns 4 
and 8 of BGH Table 1) adds 78 dummies to a regression with 240 observations: 
log
𝑤𝑖𝑗𝐹𝑡
𝑤𝑖𝑗𝐷𝑡
= 𝛿𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑗𝑡 −
1
𝜎𝑁
log
𝐿𝑖𝑗𝐹𝑡
𝐿𝑖𝑗𝐷𝑡
 (7) 
But, as noted above, in recognizing and combating competing causal stories—in effect, in expanding their 
theory beyond the pure hierarchical CES model—BGH effectively detach their estimator from theory. 
The recognition that BGH ask for more rigor in OP than is found in Borjas raises a question. What happens 
when the two sides’ studies are made comparable? Do key Borjas results meet the BGH standard of rigor, 
with all those dummies? If OP cut back their dummy set to match Borjas, would their results strengthen? 
Using the data and code for Borjas (2014)—the latest data and Borjas’s preferred construction of variables 
and weights—I find that: 
• Estimating 𝜎𝑁, the elasticity of substitution between immigrants and natives, using the Borjas form 
(equation (5) or (6) above) strongly supports the OP finding that the elasticity is not infinite, but 
about 20. For just male workers, who are seen as a better proxy for earnings effects, 1 𝜎𝑁⁄ = 0.048, 
standard error = 0.01, 𝑝 = 0.000. For male and female workers together, 1 𝜎𝑁⁄ = 0.027, standard 
error = 0.011, 𝑝 = 0.018.2  
• The BGH fixed effect–saturation robustness test based on (3) doubles the Borjas estimate of the 
elasticity of substitution across experience levels, indicating more diffuse and even wage impacts. 
The 95% confidence intervals now include infinity. Compared to Borjas (2014), Table 5.1, row 1, 
where 1 𝜎𝑋⁄  is put at 0.153 (standard error = 0.060) for men and 0.112 (standard error = 0.051) for 
men and women together, adding time-experience interaction dummies 𝛿𝑗𝑡  reduces the estimates 
to 0.070 (standard error = 0.049) and 0.071 (standard error = 0.050). F tests, to borrow a BGH 
argument, strongly favor keeping the new dummies.3  
• As explained above, we can put Borjas’s other parameter of interest, substitutability across 
education groups, to the same test if we invert education and experience in his model. Saturating 
with dummies results in exactly the same equation and results as just cited—now interpreted as 
being for 1 𝜎𝐸⁄  . 
In sum, under the Borjas (2003 and 2014) standard of rigor, OP appear correct about the partial 
complementary between immigrants and natives, even as they agree with Borjas (2014) on the other 
 
2 The regression for men and women together corrects Borjas’s mistaken use of just male wages for immigrants. 
Results are from regressions based on (5). Regressions based on (6) produce the same point estimates but smaller 
standard errors. The Stata command file accompanies this document. 
3 The Stata command file accompanies this document. 
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elasticities. The tougher BGH standard weakens the statistical strength and/or destroys the theoretical 
meaning of all the elasticity estimates in play in these studies. If that nihilism is warranted, then BGH seem 
mainly to undercut the skill cell literature initiated by Borjas (2003). 
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